Risk and economic damage assessment for 2025 and 2100, with and without adaptation by Kundzewicz, Z.W. et al.
 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
Project no. 018476-GOCE 
 
Project acronym: ADAM 
 
Project title: Adaptation and Mitigation Strategies: Supporting European Climate Policy 
 
Instrument: Integrated Project 
 
Thematic Priority: Global Change and Ecosystems 
 
 
Deliverable D-A2.2b  
Risk and economic damage assessment for 2025 and 2100, with and without adaptation 
 
 
Due date of deliverable: 28 February 2009 
Actual submission date: 21 July 2009 
 
 
 
Zbigniew W. Kundzewicz1; Nicola Lugeri2; Stefan Hochrainer3; Marco Moriondo4; 
Mart-Jan Schelhaas5; Maciej Radziejewski1; Andrzej Kędziora1; Marco Bindi4; Piotr 
Matczak1; Małgorzata Szwed1; Iwona Pińskwar1; Dariusz Graczyk1; Tomasz Dysarz1 
 
1 Institute for Agricultural and Forest Environment, Polish Acad. Sci. (PAS), Poznań, Poland;   
2 Joint Research Centre, Ispra, Italy;  
3 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria;  
4 Department of Agronomy and Land Management (DISAT), University of Florence, Italy  
5 Alterra, Wageningen UR, the Netherlands 
 
Revision [final] 
 
 
 
Project co-funded by the European Commission within the Sixth Framework Programme (2002-2006) 
 
Dissemination Level 
PU Public X 
PP Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission Services)  
RE Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission Services)  
CO Confidential, only for members of the Consortium (including the Commission Services)  
 
 
 2
Table of contents: 
 
Executive Summary 
1. Introduction 
2. Discussion of ADAM scenarios (2o and 4oC warming) 
3. Projections of climate changes and their impacts 
4. Modelling the impacts – methodological background  
5. Risk and damage assessment for 2020s and 2090s, with and without adaptation; for systems 
and sectors 
5a. River floods 
5b. Agriculture – droughts and heat stress 
5c. Forests – fire and windfall 
5d. Other weather extremes 
6. Concluding remarks 
Acknowledgements 
References 
 
 
 3
Executive Summary 
 
The present report corresponds to the Task A.2.2 of the ADAM Project (Projections of weather-related 
extreme event risks to 2025 and 2100). According to the DOW (description of work) of the ADAM 
Project, the task deals with “projections of risks and potential economic damages of selected regions / 
sectors to 2025 (quantitatively) and 2100, with and without selected packages of future structural / 
technological and non-structural adaptation measures.  
Damages caused by weather-related extreme events, worldwide and in Europe, have 
dramatically increased in the last few decades. Changes in risk of weather extremes can be attributed 
to several non-climatic and climatic mechanisms.  
Non-climatic factors are manifold. Economic development leads to growth of the wealth 
assembled in risk-prone areas, and hence to increase in the damage potential. Loss potential grows 
also due to changes in population age structure – ageing of the population increases the risk of 
morbidity and mortality triggered by heat waves. There are also man-made environmental changes 
influencing flood risk. Urbanization leads to reduction in water storage capacity in the catchments and 
to increase in the value of the runoff coefficient. In result, in urbanized areas, flood peaks 
corresponding to a “design precipitation” attain higher values and come faster than in forest and rural 
environment. Also human occupation of hazardous areas (maladaptation) boosts the risks related to 
weather extremes. However, all these factors alone cannot explain the whole observed growth in 
damages due to weather-related extreme events, and a portion of them is linked to climate.  
 Europe has already warmed by almost 1°C over the past century, faster than the global 
average. Observed climate change has not been limited to temperature, but also embraces other 
variables, leading to a range of impacts. According to projections for the future, based on climate 
models, climate change is expected to accelerate and weather-related extremes are expected to get 
more frequent and/or more severe. Hence, risks related to climate extremes in many sectors and 
regions are likely to increase.  
In this report, concepts of methodology are outlined and projections of extreme events and 
their impacts, risks and damages, are presented, without consideration of adaptation and with 
consideration of adaptation. A review of impacts (especially related to floods, droughts and heat waves 
in agriculture, forest fires and windfalls), offered in the present report, has particular reference to the 
time horizon of 2020s and to the end of the 21st century. For the end of the 21st century, two ADAM 
Project  scenarios are especially considered, represented by the global mean temperature rise of 2° and 
4°C from the pre-industrial level (i.e., 1.5° and 3.5°C, from the 1980-1999 mean). The former scenario 
corresponds to the European Union's climate policy objective, which has now become an international 
objective, supported by over 100 countries. Reaching this objective will be very difficult and will 
require effective, concerted, and global, climate mitigation efforts. If the 2°C warming threshold is not 
exceeded, many adverse impacts can be avoided. The latter scenario, representing a much stronger 
warming, corresponds to continuation of business-as-usual, with no effective mitigation and with very 
likely large adverse impacts, many of which are related to extreme events.  
 Although the spatial range of study is basically restricted to Europe, it is necessary to give a 
broader, global, background, since Europe is linked to other continents. Climate changes in Europe are 
linked to the global warming. Furthermore, climate changes in other continents, and their 
consequences, will impact on Europe in a number of ways. 
 The present report consists of six chapters. Three chapters after the introduction set the stage, 
discussing ADAM scenarios, climate changes and their impacts, and methodological bakground of 
modelling the impacts. The most essential material is contained in chapter five, dealing with risk and 
damage assessment for 2020s and 2090s, with and without adaptation; for systems and sectors. It is 
sub-divided into four sections, related to river floods, agriculture – droughts and heat stress, forests – 
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fire and windfall, and with other weather extremes (health and coasts – not tackled explicitly in the 
ADAM Project). 
 Studies of impacts of extreme natural events in future, changing, conditions are of 
considerable theoretical and practical importance. Systems are being designed and operated on the 
basis of the assumption of stationarity (the past is a key to the future). Since this assumption is clearly 
incorrect, the existing design procedures would have to be revised, accounting climate change. 
Otherwise, systems would be under- or over-designed and either not serve their purpose adequately or 
be overly costly (e. g., with large safety margin).  
However, there is a high degree of uncertainty in projections of impacts, risks and 
vulnerabilities. Climate models broadly agree on the sign (but not necessarily on the magnitude) of 
temperature change, projecting future warming everywhere. However, as regards future projections of 
precipitation and related variables, projections made by different climate models show large 
disagreements. In much of Europe, even the sign of precipitation changes is inconsistent across the 
current generation of models. 
 Since it is not possible to evaluate the credibility of individual scenarios and projections. 
adaptive planning should not be based on only one or a few scenarios, since there is no guarantee that 
the range of simulations represents the full possible uncertainty range.  
 The climate change impact on water-related sectors depends, in general, not only on changes 
in the characteristics of extremes of the river flow, but also on such system properties, as: exposure, 
pressure (stress) on the system, its management (also organizational and institutional aspects), and 
adaptive capacity. Climate change is likely to challenge existing practices by contributing additional 
uncertainty. 
This report shows that in some sectors (e.g. agriculture, forestry, flood protection), adaptation 
can considerably reduce losses. Building drought protection requires improvement of efficiency of 
water use in different sectors (most importantly – agriculture). Introduction of new cultivars and 
change of agrotechnical practices are necessary. However, extending of irrigated agriculture may not 
be a feasible solution in areas with scarce water resources. 
 Despite the high uncertainty in scientific projections, water managers in a few European 
countries have already considered the implications of climate change explicitly in flood management 
and national flood protection design codes (by increasing the design flood magnitudes). A very 
important regulation enhancing flood preparedness is the European Union’s Floods Directive, whose 
implementation is likely to considerably reduce the flood risk throughout the continent.  
Due to the specifics of situation relevant to research on projections, risk and damage 
assessments for particular systems and sectors, the material in the present report is not homogeneous. 
However, it reflects different approaches in different systems and sectors, based on disciplinary culture 
and tradition. It is hoped that novel results achieved within the ADAM Project will attract interest of 
the readership.  
Despite the progress achieved in the ADAM Project, clearly more work is necessary regarding 
the analysis of extreme events in terms of observations and coupled models, and results of ADAM 
taks A2.2, especially those to be published in a special issue of the Mitigation and Adaptation 
Strategies for Global Change journal, are likely to inform this line of research and debate and may be 
reflected in the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Europe has already warmed by almost 1°C over the past century, faster than the global average, and 
the effects of warming can be clearly observed. Further, stronger warming is projected. Mr Stavros 
Dimas, Environment Commissioner of the EU, said: ”People all over Europe will increasingly feel the 
threatening effects of climate change on their health, jobs and housing, and the most vulnerable 
members of society will be the hardest hit. We need to fight the battle against climate change on two 
fronts. We must sharply reduce global greenhouse gas emissions to prevent future climate change 
from reaching dangerous levels, but at the same time Europe must also adapt to the climate change 
that is already happening.” (EU DG ENV, 2007). The European Union's objective is to limit global 
warming to no more than 2°C above the pre-industrial level (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2007), since beyond that threshold the risks of large adverse changes greatly increase. 
Yet, in many parts of the world, people have been struggling with the adverse effects of the already 
observed, much smaller, rise in the global average temperature, so that warming of 2°C will 
exacerbate significant negative impacts (Commission of the European Communities, 2007). 
 Assumption of timelines measuring the rate of warming is very important, since 2°C warming 
reached in different time horizons, e. g. 2060, 2090, or 2200 would lead to largely different effects. In 
the present document, the 2°C warming is understood according to the European policy target: to 
constrain the warming at the end of the 21st century to at most 2°C with reference to pre-industrial 
situation (i. e. 1.5°C with reference to 1980-1999). In order to achieve such aim, global and concerted 
efforts are necessary to mitigate the climate change. Without effective mitigation, a much stronger 
warming may occur, which is schematically represented as 4°C warming.  
 Although the spatial range of study is basically restricted to Europe, it is necessary to give a 
broader, global, background, since Europe is linked to other continents, in many ways. Climate 
changes in Europe are linked to the global warming. Furthermore, climate changes in other continents, 
and their consequences, will impact on Europe in a number of ways. 
 The present report corresponds to the Task A.2.2 of the ADAM Project (Projections of 
weather-related extreme event risks to 2025 and 2100). According to the DOW (description of work) 
of the ADAM Project, the task deals with “projections of risks and potential economic damages of 
selected regions / sectors to 2025 (quantitatively) ans 2100, with and without selected packages of 
future structural / technological and non-structural adaptation measures.  
The present report consists of six chapters. After the present introductory chapter come three 
chapters that set the stage, They are devoted to discussion of ADAM scenarios, for two warming 
levels in 2100 (2°C and 4°C above pre-industrial), climate changes and impacts, and methodological 
bakground of modelling the impacts. The most essential material is contained in the (by far) longest 
chapter five, on risk and damage assessment for 2020s and 2090s, with and without adaptation; for 
systems and sectors. It is sub-divided into four sections, dealing with river floods, agriculture – 
droughts and heat stress, forests – fire and windfall, and with other weather extremes (health and 
coasts – not tackled explicitly in the ADAM Project). 
 
2. Discussion of ADAM scenarios (2° and 4°C warming) 
 
The global warming of 2° and 4°C, compared to the pre-industrial levels (i.e., 1.5° and 3.5°C warming 
relative to 1980-1999 mean, respectively) is understood as the situation in the end of the 21st century. 
Curbing the global temperature increase in 2100 to a maximum of 2 °C compared to pre-industrial 
levels (i.e. a mitigation scenario target of 1.5°C relative to 1980-1999) is the EU climate policy goal, 
supportd by over 100 countries. The global warming of 4°C, from the pre-industrial (i.e., 3.5°C, from 
the 1980-1999 mean) represents a possible scenario for the end of the 21st century without climate 
policy (business-as-usual). No doubt that, in some areas and systems, climate risks associated with 
global warming of 4°C are very high. However, it should be noted that climate risks can already be 
substantial for a 2 °C warming. Uncertainties still allow for other interpretations of what constitutes 
dangerous climate change in the context of Article 2 of the UN FCCC, because a value judgement is 
involved. 
 According to IPCC AR4 WG1 SPM (2007), the likely range of global mean temperature for 
2100 without climate policy is from 1.1 to 6.4°C (cf. Table 1). Hence, the warming of 1.5°C is within 
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the likely range of three SRES marker scenarios (B1, A1T, B2). The warming 3.5°C is also within the 
likely range of three SRES marker scenarios (A1B, A2, A1FI). However, “best values” for any marker 
scenario are higher than 1.5 and lower than 3.5 °C. Best values of warming for 2090-2099 (relative to 
1980-1999) for all SRES marker scenarios span the range from 1.8 to 4.0 °C (cf. Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Best values and likely ranges of global mean surface warming for the time horizon of 2090-99 relative 
to the control period of 1980-99 (from: IPCC AR4 WG1 SPM, 2007). 
 
 
 
However, since the IPCC estimates of the “likely” range for warming by 2100 under A1FI, 
there is a 5–17% chance that, if this scenario materializes, temperatures will go up by more than 6.4 
°C by 2100. Some analysts and economists mean that it is precisely the warmer endpoints that they 
want to be examined further to alert society to catastrophic possible outcomes whose likelihood of 
occurrence is not high (Schneider, 2009). 
Meeting a target of less than 2°C warming relative to pre-industrial conditions is possible 
(albeit difficult), if low stabilization levels of greenhouse gases are realized, but is not guaranteed 
either. The chances of meeting the temperature change target decrease substantially for less stringent 
stabilization targets. If the UNFCCC goal „to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system” is interpreted as achieving a probability (on average) of at least 50% in reaching a 2 
°C target, then CO2-eq. concentration needs to be stabilized at the level of 450 ppm CO2-eq. or below 
(van Vuuren et al., 2006). For 450 ppm CO2-eq. stabilization, the probability range of meeting the 
temperature target is 22% –73%. For 550 and even 650 ppm CO2-eq. stabilization, it is still possible to 
develop strategies that stabilize at these concentrations without overshooting the required temperature 
target, but the chances are considerably lower. For the 650 ppm scenario, the probability of meeting 
the temperature target is low (less than 18%). 
The stabilization of GHG concentrations at the 450 ppm level would require drastic emission 
reductions compared to the likely course of emissions in the absence of climate policies. Even for 
more modest concentration targets such as 650 ppm CO2-eq., emissions in 2100 will generally need to 
be reduced by about 50% compared to probable levels in the absence of a climate policy (IPCC 2001). 
Table 2 illustrates increase in CO2-eq. and CO2 concentrations and global mean temperature for 2100 
for B2 scenarios without climate policy and for three stabilization levels (650, 550 and 450 ppm CO2-
eq.). It also shows the temperature changes at equilibrium and reduction of cumulative emissions in 
the 21st century for different stabilization levels. 
 
Table 2. Overview of several key parameters for the GHG stabilization scenarios explored. (Source: van Vuuren 
et al., 2006). 
 
                                2100 concentration       Reduction of cumula-
tive emissions in 
Temperature change 
(°C) 
                               2000–2100   
                                    CO2-eq.  CO2  
                                      (ppm)   (ppm) 
%  2100 Equilibrium  
B2, no climate policy  947  708  0  3.0  –  
B2, 650 ppm CO2-eq.  625  524  36  2.3  2.9  
B2, 550 ppm CO2-eq.  538  463  50  2.0  2.5  
B2, 450 ppm CO2-eq.  479  424  61  1.7  2.0  
 
SRES scenario Best value [°C] Likely range [°C] 
B1   1.8 1.1 – 2.9 
A1T   2.4 1.4 – 3.8 
B2   2.4 1.4 – 3.8 
A1B   2.8 1.7 – 4.4 
A2   3.4 2.0 – 5.4 
A1FI   4.0 2.4 – 6.4 
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As found by van Vuuren et al. (2007), for stabilization at 450 ppm CO2-eq., overshooting this 
level before returning to the target during the twenty-second century seems unavoidable and emissions 
have to peak within the next two decades followed by strong emission reductions.  
 According to Parry et al. (2009), even with the most restrictive emissions policies proposed to 
date we will probably overshoot the 2 °C warming target adopted by the European Union and held by 
many as a dangerous limit beyond which the humans should not pass and it will require centuries to 
achieve a roughly stable climate with tolerably low amounts of warming. The consequent demands on 
adaptation will be much higher than those currently envisaged, hence policies of adaptation deserves 
much more urgent attention. 
 Apart from the temperature target, the required level of emission reduction also depends on the 
uncertain relationship between atmospheric GHG concentrations and temperature increase, 
encapsulated in the term ‘climate sensitivity’. Several probability-distribution functions for climate 
sensitivity have been reported, each indicating a broad range of values having a reasonable likelihood 
(cf. van Vuuren et al., 2007). Given the large uncertainty ranges resulting from parameters in the 
climate models, there is a need to formulate targets in probabilistic terms.  
Van Vuuren et al. (2006) explored pathways to GHG stabilization levels required for 
achieving global mean temperature change target of 2 °C with a satisfactory degree of certainty. They 
specifically focussed on the following questions: 
- What portfolios of measures could constitute promising strategies for stabilizing GHG concentrations 
at a range of lower levels (650, 550 and 450 ppm CO2-eq. and – subject to specific assumptions – 
even 400 ppm CO2-eq.)? 
- What are the costs involved in such strategies and what are the implications? 
- How do uncertainties in the potentials and costs of various options play a role for selection of a 
portfolio of measures? 
Focussing on a larger set of mitigation options than most other studies, and extending the 
lower range of multi-gas scenarios currently discussed in the literature, van Vuuren et al. (2006) show 
that stabilizing greenhouse concentrations at 650, 550, and 450 ppm is feasible on the basis of known 
technologies. There are sufficient technical options to reduce emissions to the level required and these 
options can be combined into effective stabilization strategies. In fact, under specific assumptions of 
favourable conditions, stabilization at even 400 ppm CO2-eq. is also within the realm of technical 
possibility.  
It is quite clear that the next two decades are going to be the most difficult period for climate 
change policy, even making a very questionable (wishful-thinking type) assumption of full 
participation of all countries under a climate regime. The costs of not peaking global emissions within 
the next two decades could include higher temperature change and/or rapid emission reduction rates in 
the longer term (which can be considerably more costly). 
Van Vuuren et al. (2006) mapped out some of the costs and benefits of stabilizing GHGs at 
low levels, in order to achieve the EU goal of curbing the global warming to 2 °C compared to pre-
industrial levels. Costs clearly increase for lower levels of stabilization, but so do benefits. The net 
present value of abatement costs increases from 0.2% to 1.2% of the net present value of GDP (with 
5% discount rate assumed) when moving from 650 to 450 ppm stabilization levels. However, the 
uncertainty in the cost estimates is at least in the order of 50%, with the most important uncertainties 
including land-use emissions, the potential for bio-energy and the contribution of energy efficiency.  
 8
 
 
Figure 1. The probability of exceeding 2 oC warming versus CO2 emitted in the first half of the twenty-first 
century. a, Individual scenarios’ probabilities of exceeding 2 oC and smoothed (local linear regression smoother) 
probabilities for all climate sensitivity distributions. The proportion of CMIP3 AOGCMs26 and C4MIP carbon-
cycle8 model emulations exceeding 2 oC is shown as black dashed line. Coloured areas denote the range of 
probabilities (right) of staying below 2 oC in AR4 terminology, with the extreme upper distribution being 
omitted. b, Total CO2 emissions already emitted between 2000 and 2006 (grey area) and those that could arise 
from burning available fossil fuel reserves, and from land use activities between 2006 and 2049 (median and 
80% ranges). Source: Meinshausen et al. (2009). 
 
According to IPCC AR4 WG1 SPM (2007), for the next two decades, a warming of about 
0.2°C per decade, i.e. similar to the rate observed since 1990, is projected for a range of SRES 
emission scenarios. Hence the temperature increase projection for 2025 is approximately 0.6oC above 
the 1991-2000 mean. Best-estimate projections from models indicate that the average warming over 
Europe until 2025 is insensitive to the scenarios and is very likely to be at least twice as large as the 
corresponding model-estimated natural variability during the 20th century (IPCC AR4 WG1 SPM, 
2007). 
Meinshausen et al. (2009) noted that although a global warming limit of 2 oC or below 
(relative to pre-industrial levels) has been commonly accepted as a guiding principle for mitigation 
efforts to reduce climate change risks, impacts and damages, the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
corresponding to a specified maximum warming are poorly known, because of uncertainties in the 
carbon cycle and the climate response. Cumulative emissions up to 2050 were found to be a robust 
indicator of the probability that 21st century warming will not exceed 2 oC relative to pre-industrial 
temperatures. Limiting cumulative CO2 emissions over 2000–49 to below 1,000 (1,440) GtCO2 they 
found that the probability of exceeding 2 oC can be limited to below 25% (50%), cf. Fig. 1. Hence the 
cover story in Nature about the trillionth tonne of carbon entitled “The coming climate crunch” (Fig. 
2). In another paper in the same issue of Nature, Allen et al. (2009) argues that total anthropogenic 
emissions of one trillion tonnes of carbon (3.67 trillion tonnes of CO2), about half of which has already 
been emitted since industrialization began, result in a most likely peak carbon-dioxide induced 
warming of 2 oC above pre-industrial temperatures, with a 5–95% confidence interval of 1.3–3.9 oC. 
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Figure 2. The cover story in Nature about the trillionth tonne of carbon entitled “The coming climate 
crunch”. Cumulative emissions are a robust indicator of the probability of curbing the warming to 2 oC 
or below.  
 
3. Projections of climate changes and their impacts 
 
The climate models broadly agree on the sign (but not necessarily on the magnitude) of temperature 
change (Fig. 3), projecting warming everywhere.  
However, as regards future projections of precipitation (Fig. 4) and related variables, 
projections made by different climate models show large disagreements. In high latitudes and parts of 
the tropics, climate models are consistent in projecting precipitation increase, while in some 
subtropical and lower mid-latitude regions, they are consistent in projecting precipitation decrease. 
Between these areas of robust increase and decrease, there is much uncertainty in projections. Even the 
sign of precipitation changes is inconsistent across the current generation of models. 
For precipitation changes until the end the 21st century, the multi-model ensemble mean 
change exceeds the inter-model standard deviation of changes only at high latitudes. Over several 
regions, e.g., over Poland, models disagree in the sign of seasonal precipitation change, i. e. some 
models project decrease and others - increase of future summer precipitation. 
 Observational evidence shows that many natural systems have been affected by climate 
changes, particularly temperature increase (IPCC AR4 WG2 SPM, 2007). 
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Figure 3. Projected surface temperature changes for the early and late 21st century relative to the period 1980–
1999. The central and right panels show the AOGCM multi-model average projections for the B1 (top), A1B 
(middle) and A2 (bottom) SRES scenarios averaged over the decades 2020– 2029 (centre) and 2090–2099 
(right). The left panels show corresponding uncertainties as the relative probabilities of estimated global average 
warming from several different AOGCM and Earth System Model of Intermediate Complexity studies for the 
same periods. (Source: IPCC AR4 WG1 SPM, 2007). 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Relative changes in precipitation (in percent) for the period 2090–2099, relative to 1980–1999. Values 
are multi-model averages based on the SRES A1B scenario for December to February (left) and June to August 
(right). White areas are where less than 66% of the models agree in the sign of the change and stippled areas are 
where more than 90% of the models agree in the sign of the change (from: IPCC AR4 WG1 SPM, 2007). 
 
It is likely that already a 1.5°C mean global warming above 1980-1999 (2°C above pre-
industrial) will cause considerable adverse effects in a number of sectors and regions. A warming 
higher than 3.5°C above 1980-1999 (2°C above pre-industrial) is very likely to cause much more 
deleterious impacts, cf. Figs 5 and 6. 
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Figure 5. Illustrative examples of global impacts projected for climate changes (and sea-level and atmospheric 
carbon dioxide where relevant) associated with different amounts of increase in global average surface 
temperature in the 21st century. The black lines link impacts, dotted arrows indicate impacts continuing with 
increasing temperature. Entries are placed so that the left hand side of text indicates approximate onset of a given 
impact. Quantitative entries for water scarcity and flooding represent the additional impacts of climate change 
relative to the conditions projected across the range of Special Report on Scenarios (SRES) scenarios A1FI, A2, 
B1 and B2. Adaptation to climate change is not included in these estimations. (Source: IPCC AR4 WG2 SPM, 
2007). Attention: temperature changes are relative to 1980-1999; changes from pre-industrial are by 0.5 oC 
higher. 
 
Mitigation Reference  
Figure 6. Illustrative examples of global impacts projected for climate changes. Source: van Vuuren et al. 
(2009), based on Stern (2006). 
 12
Extreme events 
 
The costs of ordinary and catastrophic weather events have exhibited a rapid upward trend in recent 
decades (Fig. 7). Both observations in the past-to-present and projections for the future indicate 
increasing probability of extremes getting more extreme.  
 
Table 3. Examples of possible impacts of climate change due to changes in extreme weather and climate events, 
based on projections to the mid to late 21st century (IPCC AR4 WG2 SPM, 2007). No changes or developments 
in adaptive capacity were assumed. The first two columns stem from IPCC AR4 WG1 SPM (2007).  
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Notes:  
a See IPCC WG1 AR4 Table 3.7 for further details regarding definitions 
b Warming of the most extreme days and nights each year 
c Extreme high sea level depends on average sea level and on regional weather systems. It is defined as 
the highest 1% of hourly values of observed sea level at a station for a given reference period. 
d In all scenarios, the projected global average sea level at 2100 is higher than in the reference period. 
The effect of changes in regional weather systems on sea level extremes has not been assessed. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Increase of economic impacts and demographic drivers of catastrophic weather events. Insured and 
total property losses ($45 billion and $107 billion in 2004, respectively) are rising faster than premiums, 
population, or economic growth. Data exclude health and life insurance premiums and losses. Non-inflation–
adjusted economic data are shown in relation to GDP. Inflation-adjusted economic losses from catastrophic 
events increased 8-fold between the 1960s and 1990s and insured losses increased 17-fold. (Source: Mills, 
2005).  
 
Yearly global economic losses from large catastrophic events increased by order of 
magnitude; from US$4 billion in the 1950s to US$40 billion per year in the 1990s (all in 1999 US$). 
The insured portion of these losses rose from a negligible level to US$9.2 billion annually between 
1950s and 1990s, with a significantly higher insured fraction in industrialized countries, and the ratio 
of premiums to catastrophe losses fell by two-thirds. (Source: Vellinga & Mills, 2001, Mills et al., 
2001). Between 1970 and 1999, weather-related losses (adjusted for inflation) grew nine times faster 
 14
than population. Over 15 years in the end of 20th century (Mills et al., 2001), natural disasters caused 
a damage about 1 trillion US$, three quarters of which was weather-related and only a fifth – insured. 
 
Non-climatic changes 
 
In the global super-system everything is connected to everything else. Figure 8 shows the inter-
linkages between climate, water, and other systems. Anthropogenic climate change is only one of 
many pressures on freshwater systems. Climate and freshwater systems are interconnected in complex 
ways. Any change in one of these systems induces a change in the other. Water use is impacted by 
climate change, and also, in many places - more importantly, by changes in population, lifestyle, 
society’s views of the value of freshwater ecosystems, economy (also - economic policy, including 
incentives to save water, such as taxes, or tax exemptions; water pricing), and technology. It is also 
impacted by food demand, which drives irrigated agriculture, globally the largest water-use sector (cf. 
Kundzewicz et al., 2007).  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Impact of human activities on freshwater resources and their management, with climate 
change being only one of multiple pressures (Kundzewicz et al., 2007). 
 
Variants of future development of non-climatic drivers, including: population, economic 
activity, land cover, and land use have been of principal importance for the emission scenarios. 
However, they are also essential for the assessment of impacts and vulnerabilities. The growth of the 
global population is important for food production and related demand on land and water. In October 
1999 the global population reached 6 billion and now (July 2009) it is estimated as over 6.7 billion. 
The average population growth in 1995-2000 was 78 million per year, i. e. 1 billion per 12.82 years. 
Medium UN projection for 2015 is 7.2 billion and for 2050: 8.9 billion (low and high estimates read 
7.3 and 10.7 billion, respectively). 
Apart from population growth, important for the GHG emissions are also changes in preferred 
diet (cereal vs meat). Growing population and economic development lead to growth of the wealth 
assembled in risk-prone areas, and hence increase in the damage potential. Growth of loss potential is 
also driven by changes in population structure, even without absolute population growth. One notes 
ageing of the population (of importance for effects of heat waves) and increase of the percentage of 
population living in urbanized areas (cf. Table 5 for Europe). In Europe, the area of agricultural land is 
projected to decrease from 2000 to 2030 by about 16%, i. e. more than for any other continent (cf. 
MNP, 2006). 
 
Table 4.  Demographic records and projections for Europe 1950-2025 (population, percentage urban, 
population aged 65+ and 80+). Medium variant. (Source: United Nations, 2007). 
 
Year Population 
Percentage 
urban 
65+ 
(thousands)
65+ (%) 80+ 
(thousands)
80+ (%) 
1950 548 194 50.5 45 045 8.2 6 087 1.1 
1955 575 970 53.4 49 304 8.6 6 954 1.2 
1960 605 201 56.5 53 488 8.8 8 029 1.3 
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1965 634 811 59.7 59 802 9.4 9 174 1.4 
1970 656 666 62.6 68 735 10.5 10 628 1.6 
1975 676 455 65.6 77 657 11.5 11 966 1.8 
1980 693 170 67.9 85 734 12.4 14 228 2.1 
1985 706 576 69.3 84 006 11.9 16 517 2.3 
1990 721 322 70.6 91 593 12.7 19 885 2.8 
1995 728 513 71.2 101 326 13.9 22 411 3.1 
2000 728 501 71.7 107 353 14.7 21 190 2.9 
2005 731 087 72.2 116 232 15.9 25 653 3.5 
2010 730 478 72.9 118 337 16.2 30 582 4.2 
2015 727 227 73.9 126 196 17.4 33 120 4.6 
2020 722 060 75.1 136 516 18.9 36 682 5.1 
2025 715 220 76.6 148 345 20.7 37 490 5.2 
 
There are many non-climatic drivers affecting water resources, both in quantity and quality. 
They are: land-use change, the construction and management of reservoirs, pollutant emissions, and 
water and wastewater treatment. Vulnerability of freshwater systems to climate change also depends 
on how water management is able to cope with existing pressures related to climate variability.  
The most important drivers of water use are population and economic development, and also 
changing societal views on the value of water. The latter refers to such issues as the prioritisation of 
domestic and industrial water supply over irrigation water supply, and the extent to which 
improvements of water-use efficiency (e.g. via water-saving technologies and water pricing) are 
achieved. The future extent of irrigated areas is the dominant driver of water use, together with 
cropping intensity and irrigation water-use efficiency. According to the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) agriculture projections, developing countries (with 75% of the global irrigated 
area) are likely to expand their irrigated area until 2030 by 0.6%/yr, while the cropping intensity of 
irrigated land will increase from 1.27 to 1.41 crops/yr, and irrigation water-use efficiency will increase 
slightly. A much smaller expansion of irrigated areas, however, is assumed in all four scenarios of the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, with global growth rates of only 0 to 0.18% per year until 2050. 
After 2050, the irrigated area is assumed to stabilise or to slightly decline in all scenarios except 
Global Orchestration (similar to the SRES A1 scenario), cf Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
(2005a). 
 
4. Modelling the impacts – methodological background 
 
Notions 
 
There exist many different definitions of terms “risk” and “vulnerability”. In the present document, the 
following broad interpretation of notions is used: 
 
Risk = (probability of adverse effects) x (consequences) 
 
According to definition in the IPCC WGII AR4 Glossary, vulnerability is the degree to which 
a system is susceptible to, and unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including 
climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude, and rate of 
climate change and variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity. 
Elements of components of risk and vulnerability are functions of time, via climate and socio-
economy and related factors. They depend on watershed characteristics (in the sense of rainfall-runoff 
relations modified by human activities), river regulation, damage potential, population (number, age 
distribution, where they live). Land-use change embraces urbanization (leading to increasing runoff 
coefficient, decreasing water storage, heat island effect); changes in agricultural land use; 
afforestation/deforestation (with consequences for gale wind and water resources). 
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Timelines  
 
There are a number of approaches to denote future situation: 
i - explicit time horizon, e.g. 2025 (typically interpreted as 2020s, i.e. 2020-2029); 
ii - future level of greenhouse gas concentrations (e.g. doubling of the pre-industrial CO2 
concentrations); 
iii - future temperature levels at some time horizons, e.g. 2oC or 4oC warming in 2100 as compared to 
pre-industrial situation, and paths leading to these levels. 
Items (ii) and (iii) may refer to scenarios without mitigation, or to particular assumptions of 
mitigation (e.g., stabilization concentrations at different levels). 
 
Modelling the impacts – methodological problems 
 
Published results of change detection in some weather-related extremes do not give a conclusive and 
general proof as to how climate change affects the system behaviour, in the light of the data observed 
so far. Often the strong natural variability overshadows weak, if any, greenhouse signature. An 
interesting case that illustrates the issue is related to high river flows and floods. It is generally 
difficult to find a gradual, low-frequency change in the behaviour of the extremes of river flow, amidst 
overwhelming natural variability. In order to detect a weak, if any, climate change component, it is 
necessary to eliminate other influences, e.g. by using data from baseline river basins, with little human 
interventions.  
Highly skewed distributions render change detection in annual maxima of daily river flows 
difficult. Kundzewicz et al. (2005) showed that it is not uncommon that the highest recorded annual 
maximum daily flow at a given station is considerably (e.g., four times) higher than the second highest 
value in the long time series of records. As noted by Radziejewski & Kundzewicz (2004), tests are not 
able to detect a weak trend or change that has not lasted sufficiently long. With the enhanced climate 
change, the changes of hydrological processes may be stronger and last longer, so that the likelihood of 
change detection may grow. However, methodological developments are needed, including tools to 
study weak trends. 
The immediate question that attracts increasing interest is the following: to what extent a 
sensible rise in various flood-related indices (e. g. flood hazard and vulnerability) can be linked to 
climate variability and change?  
In many places, flood risk is likely to grow, due to a combination of anthropogenic and 
climatic factors. Strong natural variability is superimposed on effects of man-made environmental 
changes: urbanization, deforestation, human occupation of hazardous areas, reduction in storage 
capacity and increase in runoff coefficient. A part of detected trend is linked to socio-economic 
factors, such as population increase and accumulation of wealth in vulnerable areas. However, these 
factors alone cannot explain the whole observed growth, and a portion of it is linked to climate. Trend 
detection and attribution are not trivial, because it is difficult to disentangle the climatic change 
component from strong natural variability and direct human impacts.  
Therefore, methodological constraints are manifold. Quantification of flood statistics is subject 
to high uncertainty. Flood frequency analysis, addressing rare events and based on short (often non-
homogeneous) records, involves high uncertainty, extrapolation (e.g. of the stage-discharge relation) 
and subjectivity even in the stationary case. It is much more complex in the non-stationary case, when 
a river discharge corresponding to a 100-year flood in the control period may become a new 10-year 
flood in the future horizon of concern.  
Neither a single simulation nor an ensemble (consensus) average of model results are 
appropriate in extreme event studies, since they may lead to underestimation of extreme precipitation 
and flooding. Studying frequency distributions of extreme events among multi-model ensembles is 
likely to produce more trustworthy results (e.g., Palmer & Räissänen, 2002). When undertaking flood 
studies, one has to resolve multiple scale problems. The scale of concern can range from local (e.g. 
flood protection in settlements on a small creek) up to global (re-insurance industry perspective). 
Large river flooding may jeopardize towns on a large river, along thousands of kilometers of its 
course, hence rendering the problem regional, national, or even continental. Moreover, decisions on 
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risk assessment and selection of strategy (e.g. whether to protect, or to accommodate, or to retreat) 
may be taken at a higher administrative level (e.g. central government), or even internationally (e.g. 
international river basin commissions, or European Commission legislation, such as Floods Directive).  
 
Data problems 
 
Apart from the inherent complexity of the issue of detecting a greenhouse component in flow records, 
there are serious problems with the data with which to work, and also with the methodology to detect 
changes. Data should consist of long time series of good quality records. They are not available in 
many areas. Due to financial constraints, several countries have been reducing their observation 
networks. Even if data are collected, they may not be readily available for international research 
studies, or only available at (often prohibitively high) cost. Because of strong climate variability, 
records of less than 30 years are almost certainly too short for detection of climate change. It is 
suggested that at least 50 years of records are necessary for climate change detection (Kundzewicz & 
Robson, 2000), but in the case of strong natural variability even this may not be sufficient.  
In order to quantify flood events, their generating mechanism and impacts, one has to collect a 
wealth of information on past flood events, referring to many variables and characteristics, which 
contribute to a holistic perspective on flooding (cf Kundzewicz and Schellnhuber, 2004). 
It would be enlightening to study longer time series of records but these are available only for 
a few of the variables relevant to flood risk (referring to meteorology and hydrology rather than socio-
economy)  and only for a limited numbers of locations (Kundzewicz & Schellnhuber, 2004). Hence 
results a prominent role of such initiatives as the Dartmouth Floods Observatory and its open-access 
database. 
 There are further problems related to the data, one of which is the non-homogeneity. Baseline 
conditions are rare, and human influence is typically strong (river regulation, deforestation, 
urbanization, dams and reservoirs). In order to detect a weak, if any, climate change component in the 
process of river flow, it is necessary to eliminate other influences and use data from pristine (baseline) 
river basins. Possible further sources of heterogeneity (e.g., due to changes in instruments, observation 
techniques, and rating curves, i. e., stage-discharge relationships) should also be identified and dealt 
with. A great deal of uncertainty results from the need for extrapolation of rating curves to high 
values, where no direct flow measurements exist. Missing values and gaps are further complicating 
factors. 
But, even if the data are perfect, it is worthwhile to re-state a tautology: extreme events are 
rare (Kundzewicz & Schellnhuber, 2004). They do not happen frequently, so even where a very long 
time series of instrumental records exists, one still deals with a small sample of truly extreme and 
destructive floods (cf. Kundzewicz & Robson, 2000). In case of Elbe River flood in the year 2002, the 
maximum river discharge was much higher than for any other flood on record. Hence, even long time 
series of discharge have just one large extreme, looking like an outlier. This dilemma may only be 
resolved by deriving the correct probability density functions for disastrous events from first 
geophysical principles.  
 
Uncertainties 
 
There is a great deal of uncertainty in findings about future climate change impacts and this refers 
particularly to extreme events. There are numerous aspects of uncertainty in modelling climate 
impacts, including intra-model uncertainty (same model, different scenarios) and inter-model 
uncertainty (different models, same scenario). Even if understanding of uncertainties and their 
interpretation have improved and new methods (e.g., ensembles-based approaches) are being 
developed for their characterization, quantitative projections of changes in precipitation, river flows 
and water levels at the river basin scale remain largely uncertain (Kundzewicz et al., 2007). 
Uncertainties of climate change projections increase with the remoteness of the time horizon 
of concern. In the near-term (e.g. 2020s), climate model uncertainties play the most important role, 
while over longer time horizons, uncertainties due to the selection of emission scenarios become 
increasingly significant (Jenkins and Lowe, 2003).  
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Amplification of uncertainty (“uncertainty explosion”) can be observed, throughout the logical 
chain from greenhouse gas emissions to impacts (Fig. 9). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Cascade of uncertainties from emission scenations to damages. Source: Fuglestvedt et al., 2003. 
 
Interpretation of projections for the future is not straightforward, since models cannot perfectly 
cope with reconstruction of past events. Part of the problems is due to a spatial and temporal scale 
mismatch between coarse-resolution climate models and the smaller-grid scale (hydrological scale of a 
drainage basin, which is relevant to impact studies), for which the much finer information is necessary. 
There are many other sources of uncertainty in future projections, starting from impossibility to 
foresee the future human behaviour (population change, social and economic development, mitigation 
policies at the global and national scales), controlling the future greenhouse gas emission and carbon 
sequestration. Uncertainties are also introduced by the transfer functions: from greenhouse gas 
emissions / sequestration to atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases, further to climate change 
(including feedbacks) and to climate change impacts. Every transfer function in the above chain bears 
large uncertainty. Already the climate model uncertainty (converting greenhouse gas concentrations 
into climatic variables, such as temperature and precipitation) is large. Precipitation is poorly 
represented in GCMs, which do not perform well in the validation process in some regions. There is a 
large difference between results obtained by using different scenarios and different models, while 
difference between models for the same emission scenario is often larger than for the same model and 
different emission scenarios.  
The general conclusion drawn from the science of the climate change is as follows: the 
hydrological cycles are likely to accelerate in the warmer climate. However, most GCMs show 
difficulty in producing consistent precipitation simulations of the instrumental data, while temperature 
simulations are well correlated with observations. These uncertainties, in turn, induce biases in the 
simulation of river flows when using directly GCM-outputs representative of current time-horizon. 
Furthermore, today’s climate models are not good at producing local climate extremes due to, inter 
alia, inadequate (coarse) resolution. Only in some, but not all, areas, the projected direction of change 
of hydrological processes is consistent across different scenarios (emissions of greenhouse gases, 
which drive climate models) and across different models. There is hope that, with improving 
resolution and parameterization of land-surface processes, models will be able to grasp details of 
extreme events in a more accurate and reliable way. With a well-designed research programme we are 
in a position to drastically reduce uncertainties in assessments.  
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Adaptations are undertaken locally, being most interesting to people living there. Further, time 
scale of interest (e.g. for heavy precipitation resulting in flash flood, the dynamics of flood routing is 
in the temporal scale of minutes to hours) differs from the available climate model results (typically 
given at monthly/daily intervals). Both spatial and temporal scale mismatch requires disaggregation, 
which is another source of uncertainty.  
 
Choice of models 
 
In order to understand a system, it is important to observe it, by measuring the relevant variables over 
a long time and to carry out the interpretation of the collected data and searching for trends. Yet, in 
order to project reaction of the system to a future forcing, corresponding to a changed climate, one 
needs models. Mathematical models (calibrated for past-to-present conditions) are the principal way to 
study future situations. Although purely empirical and black-box relationships continue to prove 
beneficial under certain circumstances in global change studies (with validity typically limited to the 
range of situations encompassed in the validation process), they may be subject to serious errors when 
applied under conditions not previously experienced. Hence, physically-based models, founded on 
theoretical background, and conceptual models, whose parameters have a physical sense are expected 
to be more trustworthy under such conditions. They are based on a more plausible assumption that the 
physical laws are not changing, i.e. the present laws would hold also in the future. 
The process of modelling of past and present behaviour of systems of interest is different from 
modelling for future climate. In the former, validation is an indispensable phase, while in the latter, the 
validation is not possible. In the classical approach, the available data record is split into two parts 
(split-sample approach); one being used for identification of model parameters and the other – for 
validation, i.e. check how model performs on independent observation material. In future projection 
studies, direct validation is not possible. One can assume that a (physically-based) model that worked 
well for the past data may perform satisfactorily for future conditions. In particular, if a model can 
accurately reconstruct the past, it is expected to hold promise for future projections. Known input 
signal (past observation data) and known output signal (past observation data) make it possible to 
determine (identify) parameters of climate impact model (e.g. from climate, via water, extreme indices 
to environmental and socio-economic impacts). 
Typically, there is a trade-off between model accuracy and complexity. Simple models 
produce results, which are usually less accurate than those from the complex (hence more costly) and 
physically-based (process-based) models, provided that appropriate data necessary to run such models 
are available. However, in reconnaisance (and climate change-related) projection studies for large 
areas, use of complex models is not feasible, due to computational burden and data scarcity. 
There is paucity of impact models. Models listed by Stern (2006) are simplistic. Problematic 
are climate impact (transfer) functions from temperature to health, or tourism, hence, expert 
knowledge rather than impact models is also used. 
 
Synthesis of projection models 
 
As stated in Stern (2006), physical and biological principles indicate that climate change impacts in 
many sectors will become disproportionately more severe with rising temperatures, but there is little 
empirical support for specific quantitative relationships (cf. Fig. 10), which remain rather speculative 
(largely based on common sense and site-specific records). Hitz and Smith (2004) reviewed results of 
published studies examining the nature of the relationship between the global impacts and the 
amplitude of global warming. They found increasingly adverse impacts for several climate-sensitive 
sectors, but for some sectors no consistent relationship with temperature was found. A few illustrating 
examples are given below, for orientation. Some of them are monotonic, while others have an 
extremum of impact functions in the interval of relevance. 
The Clausius-Clapeyron equation shows that the water holding capacity of the atmosphere 
increases exponentially with temperature, according to the following equation: 
 
des(T) / es(T) = L dT / (R T2)        (1) 
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where es(T) is the saturation vapor pressure at temperature T, L is the latent heat of vaporization, and R 
is the gas constant.   
When linearizing the above equation for the present conditions, one may find that every 1oC of 
warming corresponds to a 6-7% increase in the mean water holding capacity of the atmosphere. This 
means that the water cycle will intensify, leading to more severe intense precipitation and increase of 
flood hazard. Mills et al. (2001) obtained an orientation result that a 25% increase in 30 min. 
precipitation may reduce the flooding return period from 100 years to 17 years. There will be more 
energy to drive storms and hurricanes. According to orientative assessment reported in Mills et al. 
(2001), a 2.2oC mean temperature increase would lead to 5-10% increase in hurricane wind speed, 
while a 1oC mean summer temperature increase may correspond to 17-28% increase in wildfires. 
The agricultural production systems can be described by the inverse parabolic (“hill function”) 
relation with temperature. In cooler regions (including much of Europe), low levels of warming may 
improve conditions for crop growth by lengthening of the growing season and increase of the area of 
agricultural production, but further warming will have increasingly negative impacts as critical 
temperature thresholds are crossed more often. It is likely that the tropical regions may have already 
passed the peak by now, so that any further warming would be disadvantageous. The shape and 
location of the “hill” curve depend on crop. However, regionally, e.g. in Poland or the Medidterranean, 
temperature rise itself is not the only important factor – impacts on agricultural production system will 
depend on water availability (soil moisture, as result of precipitation), which may become more scarce 
in the vegetation season, in view of projected warming (ubiquitously) and summer precipitation 
decrease (likely in Poland, very likely in the Mediterranean). 
 
 
Figure 10. Simple, aggregate mathematical relationships between changes in climatic variables and impacts. 
(Source: Stern, 2006).  
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Available data show that the link between the heat-related human mortality and temperature is 
U-shaped (bath-tub pattern). Sharp increase in mortality can be observed once human temperature 
tolerances are exceeded, both on the side of minimum and maximum threshold (cold spells and heat 
waves). Warming causes decrease in cold-related mortality and increase in heat-related mortality. 
However, in some temperate-climate countries, such as Poland, cold spells are still the weather 
extremes causing the most fatalities, exceeding 200 during a single colder winter in the 2000s. 
Storm damage is over-proportionally related to the wind speed and cubic relation 
(infrastructure damage increases as a cube of wind-speed) is often postulated. Mills et al. (2001) 
proposed a quadratic relationship: doubling of wind speed is translated into four-fold increase in 
damage. Grace (2007) cited Insurance Australia Group’s experience showing that an increase in peak 
wind gust strength from 40-50 to 50-60 knots can generate a 6.5 fold increase in building claims. 
Hitz and Smith (2004) report on parabolic relations found also for impacts of temperature rise 
on sectoral damage in terrestrial ecosystems productivity, and forestry. Increasingly adverse effects are 
expected in coastal, health, marine ecosystems and biodiversity. Parabolic relation with temperature 
was postulated for additional number of people in coastal hazard zone (e.g. living below the 1000-year 
storm surge elevation), under the assumption that adaptation is based on observed practice.  However, 
by adaptation one can considerably improve the situation.  
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Figure 11. Changes in load-resistance system. Conceptual sketch. 
 
It is expected that the load-resistance formalism, originating from mechanical engineering, but 
of potential use in risk and reliability applications, can be conveniently applied to interpret the heat 
wave impacts, where increasing temperatures are superimposed on increasingly ageing and urban 
(hence, less resistant) societies. A common numeraire can be sought for both load and resistance in 
Fig. 11 referring to the heat wave impact on the ageing society. The x-axis may represent ambient 
temperature as load and resistance (threshold “problematic” temperature). For older people, lower heat 
may already cause problems, while for younger people, this threshold can be much higher. 
Additionally, for urban dwellers, a heat island effect can augment the thermal discomfort. 
 
Methodology followed in the present report 
 
The methodology followed in the present report, reflecting the Work Package A.2.2 of the ADAM 
Project, was based on mathematical modelling. The ADAM Work Block S provided scenarios of 
changes in the monthly values of temperature and precipitation, resulting from the IMAGE model. 
However, for the sake of direct translating of these climatic projections into extreme events-related 
impacts and risks, the IMAGE-based scenarios were not sufficient. Work on incorporating variability 
in ADAM Work Block S scenarios has been carried out, but the results could not be achieved early 
enough to inform the impact and risk studies, embraced in the Work Package A.2.2 of the ADAM 
Project. 
Hence, since the remit of the Work Package A.2.2 was to examine impacts and risks related to 
climate extremes for two ADAM warming scenarios (2oC and 4oC above the pre-industrial situation, 
for the time horizon of 2100), while focussing on the projection horizons of 2020s and 2090s, we tried 
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to use, to the extent possible, available material from various climate models, for conditions 
comparable to the two broad ADAM scenarios. 
The methodology followed in the Work Package A.2.2 of the ADAM Project, and reflected in 
the present material, can be generally summarized as follows. Results from regional climate modelling 
(eventually subject to necessary downscaling) were fed to impact models. In this way determination of 
impacts was achieved, that gave ground for risk-related considerations. Impact models translating 
climate change into impacts on systems and sectors in the Work Package A.2.2 of the ADAM Project 
referred to three topical areas: river flooding, droughts and heat waves vs agricultural crop yield, and 
fire and wind damage in forests. In the flood-related material, climatic input was fed to a range of 
hydrological models, to produce changes in river flow/stage, and further – changes in flood recurrence 
interval (of direct relevance to design of flood defences), flood-affected population, and flood damage 
(based on flood damage estimation model), cf. Kundzewicz et al. (2009) and Lugeri et al. (2009). 
Moriondo et al. (2009) used crop models, linking climatic input with crop yield, including various 
adaptation measures. Finally, Schelhaas et al. (2009) linked climatic input with damage of forests to 
fire and wind, envisaging a range of adaptation activities, to reduce exposure and vulnerability.  
Details of methodologies in particular impact models, for the three sectors and systems, can be 
found in the material published in the Special Issue of Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies to Global 
Change (Hinkel et al., 2009, Kundzewicz et al., 2009, Lugeri et al., 2009. Moriondo et al., 2009, 
Schelhaas et al., 2009). 
 
 
5. Risk and damage assessment for 2020s and 2090s, with and without adaptation; for 
systems and sectors  
 
The present work task deals with projections for 2020s and 2090s (that can be also interpreted as the 
horizons of the middle years in decades, i.e. 2025 and 2095). However, using a single year in long-
time projections is not recommended, as it does not have to be a “typical” year (e.g. it can be 
particularly hot or dry etc.). One has to filter out the inter-annual variability. Hence, the time horizons 
2025 and 2095 are interpreted, respectively, as 2020s (2020-2029) and 2090s (2090-2099). 
The present chapter, which is the core element of this report, is subdivided into four sections, 
dealing, respectively, with (a) floods; (b) droughts and heat waves in agriculture; (c) forest fires and 
windfalls; and (d) other weather extremes (health and coasts – not tackled explicitly in the ADAM 
Project). A review of impacts and risks in systems and sectors is offered, with particular reference to 
the two future time horizons of concern: 2020s and 2090s. Much of the material contained in this 
chapter stems from ADAM Project work prepared for journal articles in the special ADAM (Work 
Domain A) issue of Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change (Kundzewicz et al., 2009, 
Lugeri et al., 2009, Moriondo et al., 2009, Schelhaas et al., 2009, and Hinkel et al., 2009). Due to the 
specifics of situation relevant to research on projections, risk and damage assessments for particular 
systems and sectors, the material is not homogeneous. However, it corresponds to different approaches 
in different systems and sectors, based on disciplinary culture and tradition. While ADAM scenarios, 
based on IMAGE model provide insight in changes in monthly temperature and precipitation, they do 
not cover the distribution ranges of extreme events, despite the efforts to disaggregate monthly 
IMAGE-based scenarios for daily scale. It is hoped that novel results achieved within the ADAM 
Project will attract interest of the readership. 
 
5a. River floods  
 
Over several decades, floods have become more destructive worldwide, causing average annual 
material damage of tens of billions of dollars in both developed and developing countries, and 
thousands of fatalities, mostly in developing countries. Several catastrophic floods have occurred since 
1990s. The ever costliest floods were recorded in China in summer 1998 when material losses 
exceeded 30 billion dollars. In the European continent, material flood damages in 2002 exceeded 20 
billion Euro, being higher than in any single year before. In 1998, during a large river flooding in 
Bangladesh, over two thirds of the country’s area were under water. 
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Figure 12. Flood events in Europe 1998-2005, after Dartmouth Floods Observatory (EEA, 2007). 
 
Figure 12 demonstrates that floods have been a recurring phenomenon visiting many regions 
of Europe on a regular basis. The Tisza River Basin has been among the European areas where 
flooding occurs most frequently. 
 
Climate track and the multi-factor context 
 
Flooding is a complex phenomenon and there are several generating mechanisms, such as intense and / 
or long-lasting precipitation, snowmelt, dike or dam break, ice jam / landslide, outburst of glacial lake. 
One can identify three groups of factors which control high river flows and floods: changes in climate, 
changes in terrestrial systems, and changes in socio-economic systems. Changes in flood hazard and 
vulnerability are generally due to a range of factors, whose relative order of importance is site-specific. 
The climate track in the observed changes is likely, even if human encroaching into the harm’s way 
and increase in the damage potential in floodplains are often the dominating factors. Changes in 
climate and atmospheric systems of relevance to floods embrace: total precipitation, intense 
precipitation events, temperature (controlling snowmelt and ice-jam), seasonality and climate 
variability (e.g. ENSO, NAO, PDO). Changes in the frequency of heavy precipitation events can arise 
from several causes, e.g., changes in atmospheric moisture or circulation. As the atmosphere’s water 
holding capacity, and thus its absolute potential water content, increase with temperature according to 
the Clausius-Clapeyron law, the potential for intense precipitation also increases in the warming 
world. Increased atmospheric moisture contents favours heavy precipitation events and this is a 
sufficient condition, caeteris paribus, for an increase in risk of rain-caused floods.  
 Yet there are also other, non-climatic, factors exacerbating flood hazard. Land-use changes, 
which induce land-cover changes, drive changes of hydrological systems and control the rainfall–runoff 
relations, hence impacting on the flood wave corresponding to a “design” storm (of particular length, 
duration, and intensity). Deforestation, reduction of wetlands, and rising urbanization have adversely 
influenced flood hazard in many watersheds by reduction of the available water storage capacity, 
increase in the portion of impervious area (roofs, yards, roads, pavements, parking lots, etc.) and in the 
runoff coefficient. This leads to growth in the amplitude and reduction in the time-to-peak of a flood 
hydrograph corresponding to a “design storm”. On average, 2% of agricultural land has been lost to 
urbanization per decade in the EU. Direct urbanization effects are particularly visible in small or 
middle size floods, which often constitute a substantial contribution to flood losses in the longer term. 
Van der Ploeg et al. (2002) attributed the increase in flood hazard in Germany to climate (wetter 
winters), but also to engineering modifications, intensification of agriculture, large-scale farm 
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consolidation, subsoil compaction, and urbanization. The urbanized area in West Germany more than 
doubled in the second half of 20th century. The timing of river conveyance has been altered by river 
regulation (channel straightening and shortening, construction of embankments). 
 Economic development of flood-prone areas, with a general increase in population and wealth, 
has led to increasing exposure to flood and exacerbated flood losses. Humans occupy unsafe areas (e. 
g., many informal settlements on flood plains around mega-cities in the developing world), thereby 
increasing the loss potential. Growing wealth has been accumulated in flood-endangered areas. For 
instance, in Japan half the total population and about 70% of the total assets are located on flood 
plains, which cover only about 10% of the land surface. An important factor influencing the flood 
hazard is an unjustified belief in the absolute security provided by structural defenses. However, even 
an over-dimensioned and perfectly maintained dike (e.g. designed to withstand a 100-year flood) does 
not guarantee absolute protection; it can be overtopped by an extreme flood (e.g. with return period of 
1000 years). When a dike breaks, the damage may be greater than it would have been in a levee-free 
case. Further, a short memory syndrome can be observed. During a flood-free interval, nations and 
decision makers gradually decrease the investments necessary for flood-preparedness systems. 
Illustrations of this statements can be found in developing and developed countries alike, including the 
United States, where the Katrina event unveiled the weaknesses of the (river and coastal) flood 
preparedness system in New Orleans. 
   
Trend detection in flood data 
 
Berz (2001) examined inter-decadal variability of great flood disasters (understood as such events 
where the ability of the region to help itself is distinctly overtaxed, making international or inter-
regional assistance necessary) in the period 1950-1998. The number of great flood disasters in the nine 
years 1990-1998 was higher than in the three-and-half decades 1950-1985, together (Kundzewicz, 
2002). 
The frequency of heavy precipitation events (or proportion of total rainfall from heavy falls) 
has likely increased over most land areas, consistent with warming and observed increases of 
atmospheric water vapour (IPCC, 2007a), with consequences to increasing risk of flooding. Some 
recent flood events in Europe have exceeded all-time records, not only in terms of material damage, 
but also such hydrometeorological characteristics as precipitation intensity and volume, river stage and 
river discharge.  
 However, despite observation of the increase in frequency of heavy precipitation, no 
ubiquitous, uniform, and coherent increase in high river flows has been detected. The conclusive and 
general statement that severe floods are becoming more frequent is supported by a part of the available 
studies (e.g. Milly et al., 2002), while other publications report contradictory evidence (e.g. Mudelsee 
et al., 2003). General spatial patterns are problematic (cf. Kundzewicz et al., 2005). Only some series 
show a significant trend and only some of those with significant trend feature an upward tendency. It 
is not uncommon that neighbouring gauges behave in a different way, possibly due to non-climatic 
factors, which are not necessarily in tune with gross climate-related drivers.  
 Climate-related changes in flood frequency are complex, depending on the flood-generating 
mechanism (rainfall vs snowmelt). Regional changes in the timing of floods have been observed in 
many areas of Europe, with increasing incidence of late autumn and winter floods (caused by rain) and 
fewer spring snowmelt floods. Snowmelt-related high flows come earlier in the year due to earlier 
snowmelt (sometimes in winter rather than spring) and less snow cover may reduce the severity of 
spring snowmelt floods. The number of inundations caused by ice jams has gone down as a result of 
warming (more rivers do not freeze at all) and better human capacity to cope with ice-based 
obstructions of flow.  
    
Climate projections 
 
Based on global model simulations and for a wide range of scenarios, one can make projections of 
extreme events for future climate: the frequency of heavy precipitation events (or proportion of total 
rainfall from heavy falls) will very likely increase over most land areas (IPCC, 2007). More frequent 
heavy precipitation events would lead to multiple adverse consequences, such as; increased flood, 
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landslide, avalanche, and mudslide damage; increased soil erosion; increased pressure on government 
and private flood insurance systems and disaster relief.  
Projections of changes in heavy precipitation indices influence flood risk estimates. Figure 13 
refers to a particular index - globally averaged changes in precipitation intensity (defined as the annual 
total precipitation divided by the number of wet days) for three scenarios. For all scenarios and all 
time horizons, projections show increasing precipitation intensity. For the time horizon 2025 the 
differences between scenarios are small, but in the end of the 21st century, the projected differences are 
much larger (Fig. 13 a). Considerable increase of precipitation intensity for Europe (Fig. 13 b) can be 
noted, comparing two 20-year means (2080–2099 minus 1980–1999) for the A1B scenario. (Source, 
IPCC, 2007a) 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Changes in extremes based on multi-model simulations from nine global coupled climate models. (a) 
Globally averaged changes in precipitation intensity (defined as the annual total precipitation divided by the 
number of wet days) for three scenarios. (b) Changes of spatial patterns of precipitation intensity based on 
simulations between two 20-year means (2080–2099 minus 1980–1999) for the A1B scenario. (Source, IPCC, 
2007a) 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Observed trends, in % per decade for 1951-2003, in the contribution to total annual precipitation 
from very wet days (95th percentile). Trends were only calculated for grid boxes where both the total and the 
95th percentile had at least 40 years of data during this period and the data extended until at least 1999. Source: 
Trenberth et al. (2007) 
There have been widespread increases in the contribution to total annual precipitation from 
very wet days (Fig. 14) in many land regions, even in some areas where a reduction in total 
precipitation amount has been observed. This is consistent with observed significant increase in water 
vapor amount in the warmer atmosphere (consistent with the Clausius-Clapeyron law). However, only 
a few regions have sufficient data to assess trends in rare precipitation events in a reliable way 
(Trenberth et al., 2007). The rainfall statistics are strongly influenced by inter-annual and inter-decadal 
variability. 
As demonstrated by Kundzewicz et al. (2006), according to HadRM3-P results, mean summer 
precipitation over much of Europe is likely to decrease from the control period (1961–1990) to the 
period of interest in the 21st century (2070–2099). This is not necessarily so for the highest quantiles 
of precipitation amounts or for annual maximum precipitation, which are likely to increase over many 
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areas. This result is in agreement with the findings of Christensen & Christensen (2003), who used 
another climate model.  
Palmer & Räisänen (2002) found a considerable increase of the risk of a very wet winter in 
Europe and a very wet monsoon season in Asia, between the control run with 20th century levels of 
carbon dioxide and an ensemble with transient increase in CO2 and calculated around the time of CO2 
doubling (61-80 years from present). The modelling results indicate that the probability of total boreal 
winter precipitation exceeding two standard deviations (for the control period) above normal will 
increase over large areas of Europe, e.g. an over five-fold increase is projected over Scotland and the 
island of Ireland and much of the Baltic Sea basin, and even over seven-fold increase for parts of 
Russia. 
 
Flood hazard and risk projections 
 
A significant portion of the increase of flood hazard will continue to be caused by human factors, 
including land-use changes and the increase in population and wealth accumulated in endangered 
areas.  
Increasing flood magnitudes are projected in areas where floods result of heavy rainfall and 
decreasing magnitudes where floods are generated by spring snowmelt. Winter (rain-caused) flood 
hazard is likely to rise for many catchments under several scenarios. However, global warming may 
not necessarily reduce snowmelt flooding everywhere. Since an increase in winter precipitation is 
expected, snow cover may increase in areas where the temperature will still be below 00C.  
 Milly et al. (2002) demonstrated adverse changes in the risk of great floods (at the 100-year 
level). For all (but one) large basins (over 200 000 km2) analyzed, the 100-year flood in the control 
period was found to be reached or exceeded more frequently as a result of CO2 quadrupling (i.e. more 
than 4oC warming). In some areas (beyond Europe), what was a 100-year flood in the control run, is 
projected to become much more frequent, even occurring as often as every 2 to 5 years in the 4 x CO2  
future. Despite large uncertainty, Milly et al. (2002) found that the likelihood that these changes are 
due to natural climate variability is small.  
Flash floods are likely to increase in all of Europe, while snowmelt-related floods in Central 
and Eastern Europe are expected to decline.  
 
 
 
Figure 15. Change in recurrence of 100-year floods, based on comparisons between simulation for the control 
period 1901–2000 and two future time horizons: (a) 2001–2030 or (b) 2071–2100. (Source: Hirabayashi et al., 
2008) 
As noted by Kundzewicz et al. (2007), increase in floodings will have adverse impacts on 
sustainable development. Up to 20% of the world population live in river basins that are likely to be 
affected by increased flood hazard by 2080s in the course of global warming (Kleinen and Petschel-
Held, 2006). 
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 Lehner et al. (2006) and Dankers & Feyen (2008) studied projections of changes in river flood 
frequency over the whole of European continent, while Hirabayashi et al. (2008) examined the 
situation worldwide. In all these papers, the authors produced maps of changes of recurrence of an 
(originally) 100-year flood, comparing the control period with scenarios. They identified areas where a 
100-year flood in the control period becomes either more frequent or less frequent in the future time 
horizons of concern. However, results of Lehner et al. (2006); Dankers & Feyen (2008), and 
Hirabayashi et al. (2008) considerably differ and this uncertainty makes it difficult to formulate a 
meaningful message that could be conveyed to practicioners and decision makers. 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Changes in flood-affected population for different amplitudes of future warming. Source: 
Kundzewicz et al. (2009b), based on results of Hirabayashi and Kanae (2009). 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Recurrence interval (return period) of today’s 100-year flood (i.e. flood with a recurrence interval of 
100 years during the period 1961-1990) at the end of the 21st century (2071-2100), in case of scenario SRES 
A1B. Source: Kundzewicz et al. (2009a), based on results from Hirabayashi et al. (2008). 
 
In their maps of changes in recurrence of 100-year floods, Hirabayashi et al. (2008) illustrated 
areas of considerable increase and considerable decrease of flood hazard (Fig. 15). A return period of 
less than 30 years in the future, corresponding to that for 100-year flood in the retrospective climate of 
the 20th century, was projected in many low-latitude regions and in eastern Eurasia. In contrast, the 
frequencies of the extreme discharge exceeding the amount of the 100-year flood of the 20th century 
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decreased over central and northern North America, eastern Europe and western Russia, despite the 
annual precipitation increase in these areas.  
 
 
 
Figure 18. Recurrence interval (return period) of today’s 100-year floods (i.e. flood with a recurrence interval of 
100 years during the period 1961-1990) at the end of the 21st century (2071-2100), in case of emissions scenario 
SRES A2. Source: Dankers and Feyen (2008). 
 
 
 
Figure 19. As Figure 17, for the Tisza River Basin. 
 
Hirabayashi and Kanae (2009) examined changes in the number of flood-affected people 
based on flood projection by Hirabayashi et al. (2008) and population projection by Bengtsson et al. 
(2006), globally, for different amplitudes of projected warming and found a relationship illustrated in 
Fig. 16, that does not explicitly refers to the timelines (Kundzewicz et al., 2009b). One can note that 
the average global number of flood-affected people per year (one of important integrated indices 
measuring flood risk) for 2°C warming with reference to pre-industrial situation is projected to be 142 
million. For 4°C warming, the value of this index is much higher, going up to 453 million (as 
compared to the range of 20 to 300 million per year estimated in the 20th century). For the time 
horizon of 2020s (2025), when the global warming above pre-industrial reaches 1.2 oC, the average 
global number of flood-affected people per year is projected to be about 50 million. This last figure is 
similar for both ADAM scenarios, i.e. both 2oC and 4oC warming above pre-industrial in 2100, since 
for both scenarios the rate of warming in the nearest decades is about 0.2 oC per decade. Impacts of 
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flood disasters on human welfare are likely to occur disproportionately in less wealthy countries with 
low adaptation capacity.  
Lehner et al. (2006), Hirabayashi et al. (2008), and Dankers and Feyen (2008) developed 
projections of flood hazard in Europe based on climatic and hydrological models. They produced 
maps of changes of recurrence of a flood that used to be a 100-year flood in the control period, for 
future scenarios. Figures 17 and 18 show that for much of Europe, what used to be a 100-year flood in 
the control period becomes either more frequent or less frequent in the future time horizon of concern. 
For a large part of the continent, a 100-year flood becomes more commonplace, occurring every 50 
years, or even more frequently. However, comparison of Figs 17 and 18 illustrates considerable 
discrepancies between model results. Figures 17 and 18, resulting from studies based on different 
assumptions (different models, different resolutions, different scenarios, different control periods) 
should not be directly compared. There is a considerable uncertainty.  
 
 
 
Figure 20. As Figure 17, for the Guadiana River Basin. 
 
Figures 19 and 20 show the features of the map of Europe presented in Fig. 17, 
zoomed into the pilot regions of the Tisza and the Guadiana basins. Over much of the area of 
the basins, the 100-year flood in the control period will occur less frequently for future 
horizons (cf. Table 5). 
 
Table 5. Percentage of the area of the Tisza and Guadiana basins, where the 100-year flood for the 
control period (1961-1990) will be more frequent, more frequent than 50-year flood, and less frequent, 
for two future time horizons (2001-2030 and 2071-2100). 
 
2001-2030 2071-2100 Tisza 
More 
frequent 
More frequent 
than 50-year flood 
Less 
frequent
More 
frequent
More frequent than 
50-year flood 
Less 
frequent 
Echam 17,19 1,46 82,80 6,66 0,00 93,34 
HadCM3 38,70 16,09 61,30 17,19 1,46 82,81 
2001-2030 2071-2100 Guadiana 
More 
frequent 
More frequent 
than 50-year flood 
Less 
frequent
More 
frequent
More frequent than 
50-year flood 
Less 
frequent 
Echam 91,24 30,72 8,76 82,82 30,40 17,18 
HadCM3 100,00 99,71 0,00 77,00 37,47 23,00 
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Dankers and Feyen (2008) project that in several major European rivers, such as the Oder (Odra), 
Elbe, Po, Loire, and parts of the Danube, what used to be a 100-year flood in the control period, will 
become more frequent by the end of the century under the IPCC A2 scenario. In these rivers, the 
average return period of such a flood reduces to once every 50 years, or even every 20 years, on 
average. However, in NE of Europe, and in several rivers in Central and E Europe, and in the Iberian 
Peninsula, probability of exceedence of a control design flood decreases. 
 
 
 
Figure 21. Projected flood damages in 2071-2100. Left: absolute values. Right: % change with respect to 1961-
1990. 
 
Projections by Hirabayashi et al. (2008) also indicate that over much of Russia and 
Scandinavia, floods corresponding to 100-year return period in the control period may become less 
frequent in the future. In much of Poland, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, France, and Italy the floods 
corresponding to the return period of 100 years are expected to become considerably more frequent. In 
aggregate terms, over 40% of the area of Europe the control 100-year flood is projected to become 
more frequent. Over 30% of the area of Europe, the mean recurrence interval of the 100-year flood in 
the control period is projected to decrease  to below 50 years in 2071-2100. Results of the study by 
Dankers and Feyen (2008) show that at 52% of the total number of river cells shown in Fig. 18, the 
return period for a flood corresponding to 100-year event in the control period becomes longer (>100 
years); i.e. there is an decrease in flood frequency. At 48% there is an increase in frequency, i.e. 100-
year flood in the control period is exceeded, on average, more frequently than once in 100 years. At 31 
% and 9%, respectively, the future return period is shorter than 50 and 20 years, respectively. 
Additionally, the projections of Fig. 17 has been used as input to the damage estimation model 
described in (Lugeri et al., 2009), taking a simplifying assumption of no change in vulnerability and 
exposure. The Hirabayashi's data have been imported and interpolated, In order to fill gaps and 
discrepancies due to the different resolution; the projected change of the 100-years return period has 
been applied proportionally to the other return periods in the model. The output has been aggregated 
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according to the administrative boundaries at regional level (NUTS2)1 by simple sum, and the results 
are shown in Fig. 21. Both absolute damage values and relative change with the present conditions are 
shown.  
Due to the quite large difference in spatial resolution and to the broad assumptions described 
above, these projections may only serve as illustrations of broad features of possible futures. 
Uncertainty makes it difficult to formulate a meaningful message that could be conveyed to 
practitioners and decision makers, interested in flood defenses in a particular locality, yet they seem 
useful to provide, in a broad-brushed sense, a snapshot of future flood risk over Europe.  
Regional studies devoted to the impact of climate change on flood damages in Europe are 
scarce. In their study on the pan-European scale, Feyen et al. (2009) arrived at averaged expected 
annual damages at the EU and country level. It was assumed that the flood protection level depends on 
the country's GDP (protection up to 100-year, 75-year, and 50-year flood for countries with GDP 
above 110 %; in the range from 55 to 110 %; and below 55%  of the average EU 27 GDP level, 
respectively). Also a simplifying assumption of no adaptation to increasing flood levels and no growth 
in exposed values was made. Under these assumptions, useful and interesting indicative results were 
obtained. The present expected annual damage of 6.5 billion Euro was projected to rise to 18 billion 
Euro in 2071-2100 under SRES A2 scenario. In five countries the expected annual damage in the 
future horizon was projected by Feyen et al. (2009) to exceed 1 billion Euro, with highest value being 
4 billion Euro. Among 27 countries of the EU in 25 there were non-zero flood damages in the control 
period. Out of these 25 countries, increase (up to 80%) is projected in 20 and decrease (even by 85%) 
is projected in 5 countries. 
 
Adaptation to floods 
 
In response to several destructive floods in Europe since 1990, there have been important 
developments within the EU. Three flood preparedness strategies have been recognized: protect (as far 
as technically possible and financially feasible), accommodate (“living with floods”), or retreat 
(relocation to flood-safer areas). This latter option aims to correct maladaptation and enhance flood 
plain development (e.g. via promotion of concept of “room for rivers”). 
Despite the high uncertainty in scientific projections, water managers in a few European 
countries, including the Netherlands, the UK, and Germany have begun to consider the implications of 
climate change explicitly in flood management and national flood protection design codes. In the UK, 
for example, design flood magnitudes are increased by 20% to reflect the possible effects of climate 
change, based on early impact assessments. Measures to cope with the increase of the design discharge 
for the Rhine in the Netherlands from 15 000 to 16 000 m3/s must be implemented by 2015 and it is 
planned to further increase the design discharge to 18 000 m3/s in the longer term due to climate 
change. In the German State of Bavaria, the design values have increased by 15%. 
 On the European Union (27 countries) level, the Floods Directive (Directive..., 2007) hass 
now been introduced, foreseeing that EU Member States shall, for each river basin district or the 
portion of an international river basin district lying within their territory, undertake: 
- a preliminary flood risk assessment; 
- preparation of flood maps and indicative flood damage maps, for areas which could be flooded with 
a high probability (likely return period, on average once in every 10 years); with a medium probability 
(likely return period, once in every 100 years), and with a low probability (extreme events); 
- preparation and implementation of flood risk management plans. 
 The Directive (2007) identifies the timelines for completion of the activities specified above, 
with the ultimate goal to complete and publish flood risk management plans by 22 December 2015. It 
is expected that implementation of the Directive would considerably reduce the flood risk throughout 
the continent. Undertaking of further actions in the area of protection from / preparedness to weather-
related events could improve Europe’s safety against extremes, becoming increasingly severe in the 
warming climate.  
 
5b. Agriculture – droughts and heat stress  
                                                 
1 Projections on the country level has also been performed, too, but are omitted here. 
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Drought projections 
 
The term drought may refer to meteorological drought (precipitation well below average), 
hydrological drought (low river flows and water levels in rivers, lakes and groundwater), agricultural 
drought (low soil moisture), and environmental drought (a combination of the above). The socio-
economic impacts of droughts may arise from the interaction between natural conditions and human 
factors, such as changes in land use and land cover, water demand and use. Excessive water 
withdrawals can exacerbate the impact of drought (Kundzewicz et al., 2007). 
Increase in very dry land areas, globally, has been already noted by Dai et al. (2004b), based 
on existing observations. Areas with Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) below –3.0 (severe 
drought), have more than doubled (from ~12% to 30%) since the 1970s. Dai et al. (2004) found a large 
drying trend over Northern Hemisphere land since the mid-1950s. 
Figure 22 illustrates an example of use of timelines for projections. Difference in duration of 
the longest “dry” period, between 2070-2099 and 1961-1990, is shown. 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Projected difference in duration of the longest “dry” period (P ≤ 0.5 mm), HadRM3-P, SRES A2. 
Comparison between 2070-2099 and the control period (1961-1990). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Change in recurrence of 100-year droughts, based on comparisons between today’s climate 
and water use (1961–1990) and simulations for the 2020s and 2070s (ECHAM4 and HadCM3 climate 
models and Baseline-A water use scenario). Values calculated with WaterGAP 2.1. 
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A decrease in summer precipitation in southern Europe, accompanied by rising temperatures, 
which enhance evaporative demand, would inevitably lead to reduced summer soil moisture (Douville 
et al., 2002) and more frequent and more intense droughts. 
Figure 23 presents the change in recurrence of 100-year droughts, as computed by both the 
ECHAM4 and HadCM3 GCMs. Also here, a drought of a size of 100-year recurrence for the control 
period is projected to come less frequently in some regions of Europe and more frequently in other 
regions. Both models agree in their estimates that by the 2070s, a 100-year drought of today’s 
magnitude would return, on average, more frequently than every 10 years in parts of Spain and 
Portugal, western France, the Vistula Basin in Poland, and western Turkey (Fig. 23). Here, the 
ECHAM4 model shows far more “dramatic” projections for much of the Iberian Peninsula, indicating 
that a drought that was considered as a 100-year drought in the control period (1961-1990) could occur 
much more frequently – every ten (or less) years. That is, the existing drought risk is projected to get 
considerably more severe in this vulnerable region.  
As temperatures rise, the likelihood of precipitation falling as rain rather than snow increases, 
especially in areas with temperatures near to 0°C in autumn and spring. Snowmelt is projected to be 
earlier and less abundant in the melt period, and this may lead to an increased risk of droughts in 
snowmelt-fed basins in summer and autumn, when demand is highest (Barnett et al., 2005). 
Increase of droughts over low latitudes and mid-latitude continental interiors in summer is 
likely, but sensitive to model land-surface formulation. Projections for the 2090s made by Burke et al. 
(2006), using the HadCM3 GCM model and the SRES A2 scenario, show regions of strong wetting 
and drying with a net overall global drying trend. For example, the proportion of the land surface in 
extreme drought, globally, is predicted to increase by a factor of 10 to 30; from 1-3 % for the present 
day to 30% by the 2090s. The number of extreme drought events per 100 years and mean drought 
duration are likely to increase by factors of two and six, respectively, by the 2090s (Burke et al., 
2006). 
 
Climate change impacts on agriculture 
 
Climate changes, and in particular increases in temperature and changes in rainfall, have strong 
impacts on agriculture. Moriondo et al. (2009) obtained projections, with the help of downscaled 
climatic data and crop impact model. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 24. Average seasonal change in temperature (°C) simulated by HadCM3 for the period 2030-2060 with 
respect to the baseline 1975-2005. Legend: 1 = winter (DJF); 2 = spring (MAM); 3 = summer (JJA); 4 = autumn 
(SON). Source: Moriondo et al. (2009). 
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Climate scenarios used by Moriondo et al. (2009), based on HadCM3 for 2030-2060 time 
slice, indicated a general warming (1.5°C) and a slight rainfall decrease (3.5%) over the European 
domain,with respect to the baseline period 1975-2005. That is, as far as the mean temperature change 
is concerned, the scenarios are similar to the ADAM mitigaton scenarios of 2° warming, compared to 
the pre-industrial levels (i.e., 1.5° warming relative to 1980-1999 mean). 
 In the warming scenario used by Moriondo et al. (2009), temperature increase showed 
different regional and seasonal effects. Temperature projections in wintershow stronger warming in 
the north and north-east of Europe, while in summer, the south of Europe is projected to warm up 
stonger (Fig. 24). The variability of temperature increased with the mean, resulting in a higher 
frequency of “hot” extreme events for crops in 2030-2060 (Fig. 24). 
 
 
 
Figure 25. Average seasonal change in rainfall (%) simulated by HadCM3 for the period 2030-2060 with respect 
to the baseline 1975-2005. Legend: 1 = winter (DJF); 2 = spring (MAM); 3 = summer (JJA); 4 = autumn (SON). 
Source: Moriondo et al. (2009). 
 
Clear spatial and temporal pattern emerge in the projection of precipitation change (Fig. 25). 
Mean annual precipitation generally is projected to increase in the north, where the largest increases 
(between 0 and 15%) are expected in winter and spring. By contrast, a sensible rainfall decrease can be 
detected in the south, and in much of central Europe (Fig. 25). Over the Mediterranean basin, strongest 
rainfall decrease (up to 35%) with respect to the control period areas is projected in summer.  
 
Impacts on crops 
 
Climate changes (in mean values as well as in climate variability) significantly affect crop growth. The 
capacity of agricultural systems to cope with climate change mainly depends on the crop type and the 
geographical area. In general, both winter and summer crops feature an advanced emergence, anthesis 
and maturation stages in response to higher temperatures. As found by Moriondo et al. (2009), the 
duration of the crop-growth cycle is projected to decrease, in average, by 7%, 9%, 5% and 3% 
respectively for sunflower, soybean, spring and durum wheat over the entire EU domain. 
 The northern regions (with latitude above 55° N) are projected to experience some beneficial 
effects of climatic change in terms of increased crop yield for sunflower (+8%) and spring wheat (+7%) 
whereas soybean was slightly negatively affected (-4%) (Fig. 26). This was the consequence of a higher 
rainfall rate linked to the positive effect of increased CO2 and the limited increase in heat stress events 
at anthesis (+3%). Over these areas, the average value of the ratio of actual to potential 
evapotranspiration, ETa/ETp, was generally higher with respect to the present period (+8%, in average) 
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leading to a general decrease in drought stress events during the reproductive stage. These decreased by 
15%, 5% and 17% for sunflower, soybean and spring wheat, respectively. Additionally, the increase in 
heat stress events at anthesis was moderate (+5%, in average).  
 
 
Figure 26. Relative change in crop yield of sunflower (subfigure A), soybean (subfigure B), Spring wheat 
(subfigure C) and durum wheat (subfigure D) in a +2°C scenario with respect to the present period, without 
adaptation. Source: Moriondo et al. (2009). 
 
By contrast, Moriondo et al. (2009) found that in the southern areas, (at latitude below 55° N), 
yield of summer crops decreased in the range between –5% (soft wheat and sunflower) and -13% 
(soybean). This was a result of higher water stress during the season and higher frequency of heat stress 
events. The ratio of actual evapotranspiration to potential evapotranspiration generally decreased (-7% 
for soybean, -4% for sunflower, no change for spring wheat) while the frequency of drought stress 
events showed a slight increase (sunflower and soybean), or no change (spring wheat), with respect to 
the control period. On the other hand, heat stress frequency increased by 22%, 20%, 4.5%, for soybean, 
sunflower and spring wheat, respectively. By contrast, over the same areas, yield of durum wheat 
increased by 8%. This may be mainly attributed to the combination of a shorter growing cycle and to 
the crop growing season (i.e. autumn-winter) where no changes or even increase in rainfall were 
observed with respect to the present period - ETa/ETp remained unchanged with respect to the present 
period, the frequency of drought stress during the reproductive stage decreased by 10%, while heat 
stress frequency slightly increased (+2.3%). This allowed the winter crop to escape the higher drought 
and heat stress frequency which are projected in the summer period. 
 Different adaptation options were examined to test their effectiveness in reducing the negative 
impact of climate change as well as to benefit of advantages featured in some areas, according to 
climate change projections. The results for each adaptation option were compared to the relevant 
outputs as obtained in BAU scenario. 
Responses to adaptation options - Sowing time 
 
As expected, advanced sowing resulted in advanced phenological stages with respect to BAU. 
Additionally, a general lengthening of growing cycle for both winter and summer crops was found. In 
contrast, a delayed sowing resulted in a general delaying of phenological stages and in a shortening of 
the time to maturity. 
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Figure 27. Relative change in crop yield of sunflower (subfigure A), soybean (subfigure B), Spring wheat 
(subfigure C) and durum wheat (subfigure D) in a +2°C scenario considering an advanced sowing with respect to 
the control period. The relative change is calculated considering the same +2°C scenario without adaptation. 
Source: Moriondo et al. (2009). 
 
Both water stress and heat waves are projected to decrease sensibly for spring-summer crops 
as a consequence of an earlier sowing time and advanced phenological stages (Fig. 27). While these 
effects were less evident for the northern regions, which are less exposed to extreme temperatures and 
drought, in southern regions the advantages of this strategy were mostly effective. The frequency of 
heat stress events was reduced by 8%, 9% and 3% respectively for sunflower, soybean and spring 
wheat. Additionally, the average ETa/ETp increased by 8%, 7% and 4%, with respect to BAU, 
resulting in a general decrease of drought stress events during anthesis and grain filling (-5% in 
average). This resulted in an increased yield for spring wheat (+17%), sunflower (+15%) and soybean 
(+13%) in the southern regions whereas the impact on the Northern areas was very limited (+2% in 
average). The beneficial impact of this strategy was less evident on durum wheat. As mentioned 
above, the durum wheat growing cycle is already largely advanced with respect to spring-summer 
crops and this allowed a lower frequency of both heat and drought in BAU scenario. An advanced 
sowing time with respect to BAU only slightly decreased both water and heat stress, resulting in a 2% 
yield increase. 
By contrast, a delayed sowing time, shifting plant growth where the frequency of drought and 
heat stress is higher, resulted in a lower yield, with respect to BAU, for all the considered crops. As 
expected, the spring-summer crops in southern regions experienced the higher decrease in yield (-18% 
in average) whereas the impact over the northern region where slightly lower (-15% in average). This 
was the result of a lower ETa/ETp (-8% for sunflower and soybean, -5% for spring wheat) and drought 
stress event during the reproductive stage (+5% in average) as well as of a higher frequency of heat 
stress at anthesis (+10%, in average). On the contrary, durum wheat yield resulted generally 
unaffected, except for southern regions, where a delayed sowing resulted in a -5% with respect to 
BAU. 
 
Growth cycle length 
 
Moriondo et al. (2009) found that the advanced development stages, as induced by the use of shorter 
growing cycle varieties, highly reduced the frequency of both heat and water stresses for spring-
summer crops especially in southern areas. Over these regions, the ETa/ETp increased, in average for 
all the crop types, by 10% resulting in a lower frequency of drought stress during the reproductive 
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phases (-12% in average). The frequency of heat stresses dropped to -14% with respect to BAU. On 
the other hand, for the northern regions, which in future climate were less exposed to both drought and 
heat waves, these beneficial effects were less evident . 
Despite the improved ETa/ETp ratio and the reduced impact of heat and drought stress events, 
the shorter growing season adversely affected yield accumulation of both winter and summer crops 
(Fig. 28). This was mostly evident in the northern areas where sunflower yield was reduced by 27%, 
soybean by 30%, and spring wheat by 36%. In contrast in southern areas the impact was less effective 
being the difference with BAU scenario included between –12% (soybean and sunflower) and 26% 
(spring and winter wheat). 
 
 
Figure 28. Relative change in crop yield of sunflower (subfigure A), soybean (subfigure B), Spring wheat 
(subfigure C) and durum wheat (subfigure D) in a +2°C scenario considering the use of shorter cycle varieties 
with respect to the present period. The relative change is calculated considering the same +2°C scenario without 
adaptation. 
 
 
 
Figure 29. Relative change in crop yield of sunflower (subfigure A), soybean (subfigure B), Spring wheat 
(subfigure C) and durum wheat (subfigure D) in a +2°C scenario considering the use of longer cycle varieties 
with respect to the present period. The relative change is calculated considering the same +2°C scenario without 
adaptation. 
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In contrast, the use of longer cycle varieties resulted in an increased probability of both heat 
and drought stress, but the longer time for biomass accumulation finally resulted in a general increase 
of crop yield (Fig. 29). In particular, longer cycle varieties increased crop yield especially in the 
northern areas, where crops were less exposed to both water and heat stress even considering delayed 
phenological stages. Over these areas, both ETa/ETp and heat stress frequency were generally 
unaffected with respect to BAU so that the longer grain filling period was fully exploited for biomass 
accumulation. In particular both soybean and sunflower increased by 26% whereas the increase for 
spring wheat was even larger (+32%). 
The beneficial effects of a longer growing season were less effective in the southern regions 
where sunflower yield increased in average by 7%, wheat spring by 12% and winter wheat by 17%, 
whereas soybean showed even a decreased yield with respect to BAU scenario (-9%). Over these areas 
ETa/ETp tended to decrease (in a range between -7% for spring wheat and soybean to -10% for winter 
wheat) resulting in a higher frequency of drought stress (+5% for soybean and sunflower, to +20% for 
spring and winter wheat). Additionally, the frequency of heat stresses increased, in average, by 16% 
for the summer crops and by 5% for the winter crop. 
Irrigation 
 
Moriondo et al. (2009) showed how the use of irrigation for rainfed crops counteracted the negative 
impacts of precipitation decrease, allowing a general increase of crop yield with respect to BAU 
scenario (Fig. 30).  
The value of the ratio ETa/ETp increased generally over the entire domain, while the highest 
increases were observed over the southern regions for summer crops (+60% for sunflower, +35% for 
soybean and spring wheat). Only a slight increase was observed for the winter crop (+16%) over these 
areas. This trend corresponded to a decrease in drought stress during the reproductive stage for both 
summer and winter crops (-20% and -30%, respectively). 
 
 
 
Figure 30. Relative change in crop yield of sunflower (subfigure A), soybean (subfigure B), Spring 
wheat (subfigure C) and durum wheat (subfigure D) in a +2°C scenario considering the use of 
irrigation. The relative change is calculated considering the same +2°C scenario without adaptation. 
 
In contrast, ETa/ETp as well as the drought stress frequency during the reproductive stage in 
northern areas were the same as observed in BAU scenario. 
Accordingly, the beneficial effects of irrigation were more evident in the southern Europe, as 
compared to the northern areas, and summer crops exhibited the larger increase in yield with respect to 
BAU. Over this area, sunflower, soybean, and spring wheat yield increased, on average, by 100%, 35% 
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and 41%, respectively, in response to an irrigation of 142, 70, and 120 mm ha-1 season -1, respectively. 
For durum wheat the increase of yield was less evident (+24%) which corresponded to 62 mm ha-1 
season -1. In northern Europe, sunflower yield increased by 60%, soybean by 27%, spring wheat by 15% 
corresponding to an irrigation of 76, 40 and 35 mm ha-1 season -1, respectively. 
Supply-side adaptation to droughts includes enhancing water storage via increasing storage 
capacity for surface water (construction of retention reservoirs and dams), and groundwater (aquifer 
recharge); rainwater harvesting and storage; conjunctive use of surface water and groundwater; water 
transfer; desalination of sea water; removing of invasive non-native vegetation; and deep well pumping 
(Kundzewicz et al., 2007, 2008). 
 
 
 
Figure 31. Economic loss (in Euros) due to both heat and water stress, calculated for durum wheat for a return 
period of 10 years. 
However, demand-side adaptation to droughts is increasingly emphasized, i. e. by seeking 
savings („negaliters”) rather than supply extension (megaliters) via promotion of more effective water 
use; reduction of water losses, and increase of water savings. Improving efficiency of water use in 
irrigation (slogan „more crop per drop”) is particularly important since irrigated agriculture is, globally, 
the main water user, in volumetric terms. Among measures are: changes of agrotechnical practices (to 
minimize the loss of soil moisture; use of crop rotation, shifting sowing dates mentioned earlier) and 
introduction of new cultivars (drought-tolerant crops). Soil moisture should be conserved e.g. through 
mulching.  
Losses in agriculture from droughts and heat stress at a study region 
Analysis was performed for a study region – the Guadiana basin, which has been identified as a 
possible hotspot in the global change. The study was carried out for HIRAM RCM, running at high 
spatial resolution (12.5*12.5 km) for present (1961-1990) and future period (2071-2100, SRES A2 
scenario). Corine land cover was used to identify which areas can be potentially be used for cropping. 
Eurostat database was used to obtain the average price per ton of both wheat and sunflower. 
 
 
Figure 32.  Areas potentially exposed to the damage (arable lands) as derived from Corine Land Cover 2000. 
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The impact of water and heat stress on economic loss calculated for each grid point, for a 
return period of 10 years, was spatially evaluated (Figs 31-32).  
The same approach has been then extended to the Europe for crop yield loss assessment. In 
Figure 33 the impact of heat and water stress on final HI (Heat Index) of sunflower and wheat over the 
Mediterranean basin is shown as example. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33. Decrease in final HI as cumulated effect of water and heat stress for sunflower and durum wheat over 
the Mediterranean basin. The grey area represents regions not suitable for cropping. 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
Agriculture inherently depends on climate conditions, and consequently is one of the most vulnerable 
sectors to the risks of global climate change. Adaptation to climate change is certainly an important 
component of any policy response in this sector (Mizina et al. 1999; Reilly and Schimmelpfennig 1999) 
and many studies have been performed to highlight the impact on crop yield and to propose possible 
coping strategies (Iglesias and Minguez, 1996: Matthews et al., 1997; Tubiello et al., 2000; Tubiello et 
al., 2002; Droogers, 2003; Parry et al., 2004). 
While most of these impact studies have considered only changes in average climate conditions, 
analyses of agricultural vulnerability indicate that the key attributes of climate change are those related 
to climatic variability, including the frequency of extreme weather conditions (Belliveau et al., 2006). 
The general climatic picture depicted by HadCM3 in a +2°C scenario indicated that less 
summer precipitation, accompanied by growing temperatures, inevitably leads to more frequent and 
more intense droughts. Projections of precipitation change showed a marked contrast between winter 
and summer in Europe. Wetter winters are predicted throughout the continent, but in summer, there is 
a strong difference in projected precipitation change between Northern Europe getting wetter and 
Southern Europe becoming drier. However, there are large quantitative differences between scenarios 
and models. In general, the impact of +2C° scenario depended on the counteracting effects among 
higher daily evapotranspiration rates, shortening of crop growth duration, and changes in precipitation 
patterns, as well as the effects of carbon dioxide on crop growth and water-use efficiency. As a 
consequence, a +2C° scenario will have a higher impact on crops cultivated over the Mediterranean 
basin than on those cultivated in central and northern Europe. Increased temperature and heat stress 
frequency, accompanied by to rainfall reduction and longer dry spells, were the main factors affecting 
crop yield over the Mediterranean basin in a BAU scenario. However the impact of heat stress events 
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as well as lower rainfall may be either reduced or amplified depending on the crop growing season. In 
general, spring-summer crops were more subjected to the direct effect of heat stress at anthesis and 
drought during their growing cycle. This resulted in a severe yield loss. On the contrary, winter crops, 
partially escaping drought and heat stress of summer period, exhibited a general increase of yield. 
By contrast, the general increase in rainfall as projected by HadCM3 for latitudes above 55° N 
is expected to yield a general beneficial effect for both summer and winter crops over these areas. 
It should be noted that the +2C° scenario for the time horizon 2100 can be seen as a very optimistic 
development, very difficult to reach. It requires very effective climate change mitigation (to curb the 
growth of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases), understaken from early on. If atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases grow in the business-as-usual mode, i.e. no effective mitigation is 
in place, commencing in the near future, the temperature growth by the time horizon 2100 can be 
much stronger, e.g. at the level of +4C°, corresponding to another ADAM scenario. The impacts in the 
agricultural sector in Europe will be considerable amplified in comparison to the +4C° scenario, and 
the adaptation needs will be much greater both in southern and northern Europe. 
The adaptation options, as proposed here, reduced or amplified the impact of climate change 
on crop yield depending on the crop type and on the geographical area of their cultivation. In general, 
longer-growth-cycle varieties, increasing the time for biomass accumulation, resulted in a higher yield, 
as compared to BAU, for all the crops considered However, this positive effect was more evident at 
the higher latitudes, where longer-cycle varieties were exposed neither to a summer drought, nor to 
higher frequency in heat stress with respect to BAU. By contrast, this positive effect was gradually 
reduced from North to South where summer crops, extending their growth cycle, were more exposed 
to higher summer temperatures and longer dry spell as simulated over these areas. Winter crops, were, 
in any case, less affected by drought and heat stress event also in case of a longer season and their 
performances were generally better than in BAU also in the southern areas. A shorter growth cycle 
resulted in a lower impact of both heat stress and drought on final yield. On the other hand, the lower 
time for biomass accumulation generally resulted in a decreased yield as compared to BAU, for all the 
considered crops. 
At the higher latitudes the shifting of sowing dates had no impact on crop yield while the 
crops grown at the lower latitudes were very sensitive to this strategy. Over the Mediterranean basin, 
an advanced sowing time resulted in a successful strategy especially for summer crops, as already 
observed in Tubiello et al. (2000), Moriondo et al. (2009). The advancement of anthesis and grain 
filling stages allowed the summer crops to partially escaping the heat waves and drought. On the 
contrary, a delayed growing season resulted in an increased frequency of both heat stresses and 
drought that highly reduced crop yield of summer crops. Changes in winter crops were less evident. 
As expected, irrigation highly increased yield of the selected crops, especially over the southern 
regions where water may be a limiting factor especially in summer period. In general, the amount of 
water required maximizing final yield increased progressively from north to south and irrigation 
requirements for summer crops were larger than for winter crops. Accordingly, the beneficial effects 
of this strategy were more evident for summer crops.  
Climate change impact on agricultural yield in Europe was assessed, corresponding to the 
global warming at the level of +2°C (proxy of ADAM scenario) considering possible changes in mean 
climate as well as in climate variability. In particular, results indicated that while in the present period 
agriculture in the northern Europe has been temperature-restricted, in the south it has been water-
restricted. Climatic projections for the future are good news for the north, where increase of 
temperature relaxes the former restrictions, but are not good news for the south, where decrease in 
available water (due to both decrease in precipitation and increase in temperature) is likely and 
exacerbates the existing restrictions. In countries of Central Europe, such as Poland, future conditions 
are expected to be more advantageous for sunflower and spring wheat.  
Simple, no-cost adaptation options (advancement of sowing dates) may be implemented to 
tackle the expected change is southern Europe as well as to exploit possible advantages in the north. 
The framework set up for impact assessment was able to identify how, and which areas, beneficial 
effects of climate change could be exploited (i.e. longer-cycle variety where wetter conditions are 
expected in a +2°C climate change) as well as the negative impact may be reduced (i.e. advancing 
sowing time for crops grown in the Mediterranean basin). 
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5c. Forests – fire and windfall  
 
In European forests, fire and wind are the major disturbance factors. In unmanaged ecosystems they 
are part of the development cycle, driving regeneration and adaptation processes. However, in 
managed systems they can cause severe damage. Storms can seriously affect private owners, timber 
markets and wood processing industries. In the years after a storm, bark beetle epidemics can 
aggrevate the damage seriously (Wermelinger, 2004). Over the last decades, several severe storms 
have caused unprecented damage in Europe. Looking at the past decades shows that the severity and 
frequency of forest damages caused by storms has been considerable, especially in Central Europe, 
where the areas affected by heavy storms extend beyond the local scale. Storm damage, caused by 
such storms as ‘Lothar’ and ‘Martin’ in 1999, ‘Gudrun’ in 2005, ‘Kyrill’ in 2007 or ‘Klaus’ in 2009, 
affected several countries producing devastating effects to extensive areas of forest. Storm ‘Lothar’ 
caused the highest damage ever reported in Europe, amounting to 200 Mm3 of merchantable timber, 
which is almost equivalent to half of the annual wood production in Europe (Birot et al., 2009). In 
2005 in Sweden, 75 Mm3, equivalent to one year’s cut, were damaged by storms (EEA, 2008). The 
economic impacts of major storm can be tremendous: this can be illustrated by the estimates of €6 
billion of economic impact of ‘Martin’ and ‘Lothar’ in France (on a basis of 140 Mm3) (Peyron, 2002), 
of €1 billion for the storm ‘Kyrill’ in Germany (20M m3 windthrow) estimated by the German 
Forestry Council, and of €1.5 billion for the Storm ‘Klaus’ (Costa et al. 2009) which most severely 
affected southwestern France, causing severe devastation to private property and forests. The 
Aquitaine region sustained tremendous damage which amounted to 42 Mm3 (IFN, 2009). This 
corresponds to nearly 7 years of the region’s annual harvest and 2 years of France’s annual softwood 
harvest. Storm ‘Klaus’ came at a time of weak roundwood markets, when demand was down by 50%, 
and prices fell. 
 Fires do not only pose a direct threat to the forest, but they can do very serious damage to 
properties in and around the forest. Several dry and hot summers over the last decade have led to 
unprecented fires, especially in Mediterranean Europe. The heat wave of 2003 marked a severe fire 
season. In Portugal, 5.6% of the forest area was burned, with damage estimated at over €1 billion 
(UNEP, 2004). The fires in 2007 in Greece are estimated to have caused damage at the level of €3 
billion (Davidson, 2007).  
Disturbances in forests by wind and fire seem to have increased over the last decades 
(Schelhaas et al., 2003). Climate change might play a role in this increase, but this is clearly a multi-
factor case, as changes in the forest have also influenced the situation. Over the last 50 years, the 
European forest has changed considerably. In most parts of Europe the forest area expanded, the 
growing stock increased and the forest has become older. These trends are expected to continue until 
2100 (Nabuurs et al. 2007), which can contribute to an increased probability of large disturbance 
events in future. Where other studies focused their adaptation measures at the level of forest stand to 
landscape scale (Agee and Skinner, 2005; Zeng et al., 2004) the ADAM project for the first time 
studied adaptation at the national scale. Targets for adaptation measures are decreasing the 
vulnerability of the forest to disturbance by wind and fire, and decreasing the exposure (timber stock) 
to disturbance by wind. These measures are tested for a few case study countries across a north-south 
and west-east gradient over Europe (Finland, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Poland and Italy for fire; 
Finland, the United Kingdom, Denmark and the Czech Republic for wind). For all countries an 
assessment is made of future hazard, vulnerability and exposure as defined in deliverable A2.1, under 
a baseline scenario and for several adaptation scenarios. The combined development of these 
components gives a qualitative impression of future risk, where risk is defined as the probability of 
large disturbance events that cause major economic damage. Due to problems with the historic data 
(see A2.1), no relationship between the risk components and damage could be derived, so that 
quantitative risk estimates for the future were not possible.  
 
Methods 
 
For the development of future exposure and vulnerability under various adaptation measures, the 
European Forest Information Scenario model (EFISCEN V3.1.3) was applied. EFISCEN is a model 
that simulates the development of forest resources at scales from provincial to European level 
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(Schelhaas et al., 2007). The core of the EFISCEN model was developed by Sallnäs (1990). EFISCEN 
is mostly used as a tool to evaluate and compare different scenarios. Scenarios can be defined in terms 
of changes in forest area, changes in increment level due to changing environmental conditions, 
management regime and expected wood demand. Principal outputs are species and age class 
distributions, growing stock volumes, harvesting levels and increments at five-year intervals. 
Initialisation data were taken from the forest resources part of the European Forest Sector Outlook 
Studies of the UN-ECE (Schelhaas et al., 2006a; Schelhaas et al., 2006b). Baseline management 
regimes were adopted from Nabuurs et al. (2007). 
 
Adaptation scenarios 
 
The main risk component that forest management can influence when considering fire is vulnerability. 
Lowering fire vulnerability can be achieved by decreasing the share of young forest, and by decreasing 
the share of flammable species. The following four adaptation scenarios were considered: 
1. Rotation length increase: For all species, the earliest age of possible harvest was increased 
by 10 years. At the same time, the period when thinnings are possible was increased by 10 
years. 
2. Tree species change: Regeneration of coniferous area was done (in 50%) by broadleaved 
species, equally distributed over the available tree species. 
3. A combination of the above, aimed at obtaining older stands: An increase in rotation 
length, combined with a tree species change towards broadleaves. 
4. A combination of the above, aimed at fast conversion to broadleaves: An increase in 
rotation length and harvest level, combined with a tree species change towards 
broadleaves. 
For adaptation to wind, forest management can aim at decreasing exposure, or at decreasing 
vulnerability. Decreasing exposure can be achieved by increased harvest levels, and decreasing 
vulnerability by decreasing the share of old forest and by changing tree species towards more stable 
species, like broadleaves. The following four adaptation scenarios were considered: 
5. Increased harvest level: The demand was increased by 10% each 5-year time step, to 
reflect institutional and economic constraints on increases of the harvest level.  
6. Rotation length decrease: For all species, the earliest age of possible harvest was 
decreased by 10 years. At the same time, the period when thinnings are possible was 
decreased by 10 years.  
7. Tree species change: Regeneration of coniferous area was done (in 50%) by broadleaved 
species, equally distributed over the available tree species. 
8. A combination of the above: A decrease in rotation length, an increase in harvest level, 
and a tree species change towards broadleaves. 
 
Fire 
 
Countries in Europe have generally showed an increase in exposure to fire in the period 1950-2000, 
and the forest area is projected to increase further in future. Regarding the vulnerability, different 
countries showed different patterns. Poland had large afforestations after the Second World War, 
mainly with conifers, leading to high vulnerabilities around 1950. These plantations are getting older, 
leading to a lower vulnerability in 2000. Under the baseline scenario, the vulnerability was expected to 
remain at the same level. For all other scenarios, vulnerability decreased. In Denmark and the United 
Kingdom the expansion of forest area continued longer, leading to a stable vulnerability between 1950 
and 2000. Under all scenarios, vulnerability is expected to decrease in future. Finland showed an 
increase in vulnerability between 1950 and 2000, probably due to the regeneration of many old stands 
and the focus on coniferous species. Under all scenarios, the vulnerability was expected to decrease 
towards 2100. For Italy, no information on age class structure prior to 1985 was available. Between 
1985 and 2000, vulnerability was constant, and under all scenarios it decreased in future.  
 Figure 34 summarises the development of hazard, vulnerability and exposure to fire between 
1950 and 2100, relative to the situation in 2000. Poland, Italy and Finland show an increase in fire 
risk, because all components are unchanged or increasing in future. For Denmark and UK, exposure 
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and hazard are increasing, but vulnerability is decreasing at the same time. However, it is not clear 
how far the decrease in vulnerability can counteract the increase in the other two components. 
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Figure 34. Change in hazard, exposure and vulnerability to fire for 1950, 2000 and 2100 (climate: A2 
scenario; vulnerability: baseline scenario), relative to the situation in 2000, for Finland, Denmark, the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Poland and Italy. For details, see Schelhaas et al. (2009). 
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Due to climate change, the fire weather is expected to become much worse, leading to a 
considerable increase in fire risk. The most effective scenario at the national scale was to reduce the 
vulnerability by promoting the conversion of conifers to broadleaves. 
Increasing rotation length had only a small positive effect in all countries, as compared to the 
baseline scenario. Changing the species distribution towards conifers reduced the vulnerability to fire 
by 0 to 0.39 points. Combining species change with an increase in rotation length only had a slightly 
more positive effect than changing tree species alone. Increasing the harvest level to speed up changes 
in tree species distribution had a negative effect up to 0.2 points in 3 cases and a positive effect up to 
0.33 points in 2 cases. 
 
Wind 
 
The maximum annual windspeed that can be expected above land is clearly linked to distance to the 
Atlantic Ocean and other seas. For instance, the United Kingdom is fully exposed to depressions 
coming from the Atlantic and on average experiences an annual maximum windspeed of 19.4 m/s, 
while in the Czech Republic it is 12.2 m/s (data for 1948-2007).  
Due to its skewed age class distribution, the United Kingdom shows the lowest vulnerability 
indicator of the countries under study (for details, see Schelhaas et al., 2009), but it was projected to 
increase from 1.7 in 2000, to 3.6 by 2100 under the baseline scenario. Denmark showed a similar 
development, but a drastic increase was projected from 2.2 (2000) to 3.6 in 2100 under the baseline 
scenario. Due to the harvest of older stands in Finland, vulnerability decreased from 3.9 in 1952 to 3.0 
in 2000. Under the baseline scenario, it is expected to increase to 3.2. Vulnerability in Czech Republic 
was stable over the last half a century at 3.5 and is hardly expected to change over the coming century. 
Decreasing rotation lengths had in all countries only a very minor effect on the vulnerability. 
Increasing the harvest level had not much effect in the Czech Republic (-0.1 point), but a high effect in 
Denmark (-1.5) and the United Kingdom (-1.9). Changing the species distribution towards broadleaves 
resulted in a decrease of the vulnerability in the range of 0.5 (Untied Kingdom) to 0.8 (Czech 
Republic). The combination of these three scenarios gave the highest reductions of vulnerability, with 
a reduction just below 1 point for the Czech Republic to a reduction of 2.4 in the United Kingdom. For 
more details, see Schelhaas et al. (2009). 
 Exposure, expressed as the total timber volume in a country, is strongly related to the forest 
area in a country. Denmark only has little timber volume (74 million m3 in 2000) in comparison with 
Finland (over 2 billion m3 in 2000). All countries showed a huge increase in timber volume over the 
period 1950-2000, and this increase is projected to continue towards 2100. Decreasing the rotation age 
or changing the tree species composition only had a minor effect on the exposure. Increasing the 
harvest level had a strong effect, but could in many cases not avoid an increase in exposure in 2100 as 
compared to 2000. The combination of the three scenarios yielded an exposure in 2100 comparable to 
the increasing harvest scenario, only in Finland was the reduction of exposure more pronounced. 
Figure 35 summarises the development of hazard, vulnerability and exposure between 1950 and 2100 
(baseline scenario), relative to the situation in 2000. Under the assumption that the wind climate will 
not change, risk will increase considerably in Denmark and the UK, due to higher exposure and higher 
vulnerability. The risk in Finland and Czech Republic will also increase, but only due to an increase in 
the exposure. 
The most effective adaptation scenario at the national scale was to reduce the vulnerability by 
promoting the conversion of conifers to broadleaves. It is still uncertain how climate change will affect 
future risk to wind damage in forests, but the projected increase in exposure and vulnerability will 
increase the risk considerably. Only an increase in harvest level can stop the current build-up of 
growing stock, while at the same time it will lower vulnerability through the reduction of the share of 
old and vulnerable stands. Changing species from conifers to broadleaves helps to reduce vulnerability 
as well. Lowering vulnerability by decreasing the rotation length is only effective in combination with 
a high demand of wood. 
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Figure 35. Change in hazard, exposure and vulnerability to wind for 1950, 2000 and 2100 (baseline scenario), 
relative to the situation in 2000, for Finland, Denmark, the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic. For 
absolute values see Schelhaas et al. (2009). 
 
5d. Other weather extremes  
 
The present section deals collectively with sectors and systems that were not tackled explicitly in the 
ADAM Project (health and coasts, where information from beyond the ADAM Project results is 
compiled, and some other extremes that are only signalled).  
Heat waves have become increasingly frequent in summer and affect increasingly ageing 
European society. Even if there has been no health-related component in ADAM, it was found useful 
to include some external material, for the sake of complexity. Figure 36 illustrates the rapid, violent 
increase of daily mortality during the summer 2003 heat wave in Paris, France, with peak following 
the heat of 12 August (with high night time temperature). 
Figures 37-38 represent relationships between maximum daily temperature and mortality, 
resulting from studies in Europe and North America. Figure 39 illustrates links between the age 
classes and heat-related deaths. Projections of changes in heat-related death in Europe for the 2080s 
(in comparison to the control period 1961-1990) are shown in Fig. 40. 
A changing climate will have other health implications than temperature-related mortality (van 
Vuuren et al., 2009). For instance, in urban areas higher temperatures combined with air pollutants 
could lead to smog episodes, resulting in significant numbers of deaths (WHO, 2005). 
 
 47
 
 
Figure 36. Daily mortality during the heat wave in Paris, summer 2003. 
 
 
 
Figure 37. Relation between maximum daily temperature and mortality in a European city. Source: Koppe et al. 
(2004). 
 
 
 
Figure 38. Total mortality vs maximum daily temperature. Results of a Spanish study. Source: Koppe et al. 
(2004). 
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Figure 39. Annual rate of heat-related deaths per million population in the United States resulting from weather 
conditions according to age group, 1979–1997. Source: Koppe et al. (2004). 
 
 
 
Figure 40. Simulated average annual differences in heat-related death per 100 000 persons by the 2080s (2071-
2100) for the SRES A2 scenario, compared to 1961-1990, using climate-dependent health functions (no 
acclimatisation). Source: Commission of the European Communities (2007). 
 
The impacts of sea-level rise on the coastal areas of Europe are expected to be 
overwhelmingly negative based on earlier studies and reviews (see discussion in Hinkel et al., 2009). 
The major impacts are expected to be increased flooding, increased erosion and permanent inundation, 
particularly for coastal ecosystems.  
In the PESETA Project, Richards and Nicholls (2006) used the DIVA model (developed under 
DINAS-COAST Project), i.e. integrated model of coastal systems that assesses biophysical and socio-
economic impacts of sea-level rise and socio-economic development, to show that the estimated 
adaptation costs are much lower than the expected damages due to sea-level rise, and that this appears 
a viable strategy. The Mediterranean and the Baltic appears more vulnerable than the Atlantic coasts 
of Europe. 
Hinkel et al. (2009) applied the DIVA model to assess the risk of and adaptation to sea-level 
rise for the EU27 in the 21st century under the IPCC A2 and B1 scenarios. For each scenario, impacts 
were estimated without and with adaptation (in form of increasing dike heights and nourishing 
beaches) based on a costs-benefits analysis. Before 2050, the level of impacts is primarily determined 
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by socio-economic development. In 2100 and assuming no adaptation, the population affected by 
coastal flooding is estimated to be 570 x 103 people/year under A2 and 150 x 103 people/year under 
B1. The total monetary damage caused by flooding, salinity intrusion, land erosion and migration is 
projected (Hinkel et al., 2009) to be US$ 7.5 x 109 under both scenarios in 2100; while damage costs 
relative to GDP are highest for the Netherlands (0.13% of GDP under A2). Adaptation is expected to 
reduce the number of people flooded by factor 110 to 220 and total damage costs by factors 4 to 5. In 
2100. Adaptation costs are projected to be US$ 2.0 x 109 under A2 and 1.6 x 109 under B1. Under A2, 
adaptation costs relative to the national GDP are highest for Denmark (0.05%), followed by Ireland, 
Cyprus and Estonia (0.03%). These results suggest that adaptation measures to sea-level rise are 
beneficial and affordable. 
  Under A2+NO, damage costs are estimated to be US$ 1.5 x 109  per year in 2010 and US$ 7.5 
x 109 per year in 2100. The differences between the two scenarios are minor, because the higher sea-
level rise under A2 is compensated by smaller GDP growth under A2, which in turn reduces damage 
costs. Total damage costs amount to roughly 0.03% of GDP of the European coastal countries in 2100 
under A2 and 0.02% under B1. 
  Compared to the previous simulations without adaptation, adaptation reduces the number of 
people flooded significantly. Under B1, adaptation reduces the number of people flooded by factor 13 
in 2050 and by factor 110 in 2100. Under A2 the number is reduced by factor 7 in 2050 and by factor 
220 in 2100. Note that the number of people flooded per year actually decreases over the century 
under the CBA simulations even though sea level is rising, because dikes are raised to a higher 
protection level as GDP increases (expressing people’s decreasing tolerance of risk with rising 
wealth). The country most affected under the simulations with adaptation are the UK, France and the 
Netherlands with around 500 people flooded per year in 2100 under A2 and 300 under B1. Under both 
scenarios, the number of people forced to migrate due to coastal erosion are reduced by a factor of 5 
compared to the simulations without adaptation in 2100. Migration increases only slightly over the 
century under the B1+CBA simulation, but triples under A2+CBA, which is a consequence of both the 
higher sea-level rise and the higher coastal population projected under the A2 scenario. 
The present report does not cover all the weather extremes of concern in Europe, since some 
of them were not tackled in the ADAM Project. Other extremes of potential concern to this task 
include snow (deficit or abundance), gale wind effects on infrastructure (e.g. highly destructive storms 
responsible for large material damage in much Europe). Abundance of snow – avalanches – are 
destructive, but also lack of snow in December 2006 and January 2007 in large areas of Europe (e.g. in 
Poland) has adversely affected winter tourism and sport activities. The lack of snow was considered as 
an extreme weather event (non-event) and requests to announce natural disaster (emergency) status in 
the South of Poland were issued.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
Studies of impacts of extreme natural events in future, changing, conditions are of considerable 
theoretical and practical importance. Systems have been designed and are operated on the basis of the 
assumption of stationarity (the past is a key to the future). Since this assumption is clearly incorrect, 
the existing design procedures have to be revised. Otherwise, systems would be under- or over-
designed and either not serve their purpose adequately or be overly costly (e. g., with large safety 
margin).  
 There is no doubt that the future changes of impacts of weather extremes and related 
vulnerability will be complex. Increasing risk of climate extremes and their adverse impacts is driven 
by climate change (and changing climate variability, in particular) and changes in socio-economy 
(economic development, urbanization and shrinkage of agriculture) that shape the damage potential. 
 The IPCC TAR statement that „the analysis of extreme events in both observations and 
coupled models is underdeveloped” remains broadly valid to-date, despite the progress achieved in the 
IPCC AR4 process and beyond.  
 It is difficult to evaluate the credibility of individual scenarios and projections. Multi-model 
probabilistic approaches are preferable to using the output of only one climate model, when assessing 
uncertainty in the climate change impacts. The large range for different climate model-based scenarios 
(cf. ENSEMBLES Project of the EU) suggests that adaptive planning should not be based on only one 
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or a few scenarios, since there is no guarantee that the range of simulations represents the full possible 
range. However, results of the ENSEMBLES Project came late in the ADAM Project time, so that 
they cannot be broadly included. 
 Assessment of climate change impacts typically do not include adaptation. In studies of 
thermal stress during heat waves, one typically considers different temperature indices and the number 
of elderly people in towns, but not adaptation, e. g. the extent of air-conditioning (with involved 
investment and operation costs, and disadvantages related to climate change mitigation - energy use, 
and greenhouse gas emission). 
 This report shows that in some sectors (e.g. agriculture, forestry, flood protection), adaptation 
can considerably reduce losses. The climate change impact on water-related sectors depends, in 
general, not only on changes in the characteristics of streamflow, but also on such system properties, 
as: exposure, pressure (stress) on the system, its management (also organizational and institutional 
aspects), and adaptive capacity. Climate change is likely to challenge existing practices by 
contributing additional uncertainty. 
Building drought protection requires improvement of efficiency of water use in different 
sectors (most importantly – agriculture). Introduction of new cultivars and change of agrotechnical 
practices are necessary. However, extending of irrigated agriculture may not be a feasible solution. For 
instance, Polish agriculture is mostly rain-fed and there would be no water for massive irrigations in 
this increasingly water-scarce country. Despite the high uncertainty in scientific projections, water 
managers in a few European countries have already begun to consider the implications of climate 
change explicitly in flood management and national flood protection design codes (by increasing the 
design flood magnitudes). A very important regulation on flood preparedness is the European Union’s 
(27 countries) Floods Directive (Directive..., 2007) whose implementation is likely to considerably 
reduce the flood risk throughout the continent.  
Due to the specifics of situation relevant to research on projections, risk and damage 
assessments for particular systems and sectors, the material in the present report is not homogeneous. 
However, it reflects different approaches in different systems and sectors, based on disciplinary culture 
and tradition. It is hoped that novel results achieved within the ADAM Project will attract interest of 
the readership. 
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